According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), HB 2529 is projected to have a fiscal impact of approximately $885,000 per year to the state’s General Revenue Fund, resulting in a $1.77 million total cost over the 2026–2027 biennium. This financial impact stems from the bill’s provision that county judges performing judicial duties would become eligible for salary supplements based on the longevity pay schedule of district judges. Specifically, the bill would entitle county judges to a supplement equivalent to 18% of the salary paid to a district judge with comparable years of service, rather than basing the supplement on the base salary alone.

This change would introduce tiered supplemental pay for county judges, increasing costs as judges accumulate years of service—mirroring how district judges receive step increases over time. According to the LBB analysis, this projected cost was calculated based on anticipated eligibility increases and salary enhancements triggered at four-year and eight-year service benchmarks.

However, the Committee Substitute version of the bill narrowed its scope, focusing instead on clarifying eligibility for the existing 18% supplement by tying it to a threshold of 18% judicial functions or work hours. It does not increase the amount of the supplement based on tenure. As a result, while the engrossed version could lead to a modest increase in the number of eligible judges (and thus incremental cost), it avoids the more significant financial obligations projected under the original filing.

In summary, the fiscal implications of HB 2529 vary significantly based on the version. The originally filed version would have had a measurable and recurring cost to the state due to expanded longevity-based supplement tiers. The substitute version simplifies eligibility without escalating the supplement amount, thus containing fiscal exposure.

HB 2529 addresses an equity issue in judicial compensation by allowing certain county judges to receive a state salary supplement based not on a flat base district judge salary, but on the salary of a district judge with comparable years of service. This aligns with prior increases made for district judges under HB 2384 (86R), from which county judges were excluded. The bill aims to ensure that constitutional county judges who perform judicial functions are compensated more fairly relative to their peers at the state level.

The bill has garnered strong support from the county-level stakeholder community, including testimony from the County Judges and Commissioners Association of Texas and representatives from urban and rural counties. The proposed change is narrow in scope and does not affect judicial base salaries, retirement benefits, or legislative pensions—avoiding the fiscal concerns that accompanied earlier judicial compensation legislation such as SB 293.

However, HB 2529 does introduce a modest but open-ended fiscal obligation by tying the supplement to judicial longevity pay. While this does not automatically escalate costs, it could increase the state’s future obligations as more county judges qualify for longevity-based adjustments. Furthermore, the bill does not introduce new reporting or oversight mechanisms to verify compliance with the 18% judicial work threshold.

Given the bill's intention to address a legitimate gap in compensation policy without affecting other systems, but also considering its fiscal exposure and lack of clear accountability provisions, Texas Policy Research remains NEUTRAL on HB 2529. The bill does not violate core liberty principles but raises valid concerns about long-term cost management and state responsibility for local pay structures.

• Individual Liberty: The bill does not directly impact personal freedoms or civil liberties. It neither restricts nor expands rights of citizens. However, indirectly, some may argue that transparent and well-compensated local judicial officials help protect individual liberty through consistent access to justice. This is a neutral to mildly supportive impact.
• Personal Responsibility: By lowering the bar for receiving state-funded salary supplements (making more judges eligible through service-based rather than merit-based criteria), the bill may be seen as diluting the principle of earning compensation based strictly on performance. It disconnects reward from individual initiative or judicial output and instead ties it to tenure. While not egregious, this reflects a mild erosion of personal responsibility standards in public compensation.
• Free Enterprise: HB 2529 maintains government as the payer of compensation enhancements based on years of service, which can be viewed as inconsistent with market-based compensation practices. In the private sector, longevity pay is often tied to performance or productivity. Expanding supplements regardless of measurable output may undercut the ethos of efficiency and merit that drives free enterprise.
• Private Property Rights: There is no direct effect on private property rights. One could make a weak argument that better-compensated judges ensure more consistent judicial decision-making in property-related cases, especially in rural counties—but the connection is indirect at best. The bill is neutral on this principle.
• Limited Government: This is where HB 2529 is most vulnerable. It expands the state’s financial obligation to local officials without a clear, corresponding increase in service or accountability. County governments—responsible for setting their own officials’ pay—are effectively offloading more of that responsibility onto the state. This blurs the boundary between state and local roles and expands state government’s fiscal footprint in areas traditionally left to local control.