According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), SB 10 is not expected to have a significant fiscal impact on the State of Texas. The changes primarily affect the property tax calculation authority of local governments rather than state agencies or state revenues. The bill alters the formula for calculating the voter-approval tax rate, specifically lowering the multiplier used to determine how much revenue a taxing unit may raise without triggering a voter approval election. This multiplier is reduced from 3.5 percent to 2.5 percent for most taxing units—excluding special taxing units and municipalities or counties with populations under 75,000.
While the precise fiscal impact on local governments is difficult to predict due to varying local decisions on tax rates and voter behavior, the LBB notes that reducing the multiplier constrains property tax growth, which may lead to lower tax levies over time unless voters approve higher rates. According to estimates provided by the Comptroller, if jurisdictions do not exceed the new lower voter-approval tax rate, the cumulative effect on property tax revenues could be substantial. The potential revenue loss is estimated at $208.9 million in tax year 2026, growing to $1.09 billion by tax year 2030. These figures assume that jurisdictions uniformly comply with the new limits and that no voter-approved increases occur—thus serving as illustrative maximums rather than precise projections.
In essence, while the bill does not directly affect state finances, it could lead to a meaningful reduction in future property tax revenues for many local governments, depending on how often and by how much they would have otherwise increased tax rates above the new threshold without voter input.
SB 10 proposes a targeted reform to the Texas property tax system by reducing the voter-approval tax rate multiplier from 3.5% to 2.5% for taxing units that are not classified as special taxing units or small municipalities/counties (those with populations under 75,000). The voter-approval tax rate represents the threshold beyond which a taxing unit must seek voter approval to increase its maintenance and operations (M&O) property tax rate. By lowering this multiplier for larger jurisdictions, S.B. 10 strengthens voter control over property tax increases in those areas, increasing democratic accountability and slowing the pace of automatic levy growth.
On its face, the bill reinforces key liberty principles such as individual liberty, limited government, and the protection of private property rights. It empowers taxpayers by requiring more frequent elections when local governments seek to raise taxes beyond a reduced threshold. In doing so, it makes tax increases less automatic and more dependent on direct public consent. It also aims to correct a trend observed since 2019, wherein municipal and county property tax levies continued to rise, often at faster rates than school district taxes, despite state-level school tax relief.
However, the bill’s design reveals critical shortcomings. Most notably, the reduced multiplier only applies to taxing units serving populations over 75,000. This exclusion leaves a large number of Texans in small to mid-sized jurisdictions without the enhanced protection the bill offers. Many of these areas are among the most rapidly growing in the state and are precisely where taxpayers feel the pressure of expanding local budgets. This creates an inequitable system of tax restraint where some residents are safeguarded from tax increases while others are not, simply based on jurisdiction size. It also undermines the principle of equal treatment under the law and weakens the policy’s consistency and long-term credibility.
Further, SB 10, like its predecessor (SB 9 from the prior special session), fails to address one of the most critical components of sustainable fiscal reform: spending restraint. Governor Abbott’s call for a special session included not just property tax rate reform, but also local government spending limits. SB 10 completely omits this second pillar. Without spending controls, taxing entities can still pursue aggressive growth through alternative means such as new fees, creative accounting, and the strategic use of exemptions. The bill restricts one lever of revenue generation without addressing the underlying drivers of government expansion. In this way, the bill risks being circumvented by the very entities it is meant to constrain.
The fiscal implications reinforce the selective nature of the reform. While the state faces no direct budget impact, the bill is projected to reduce property tax revenues for affected local governments by an estimated $208.9 million in tax year 2026, climbing to over $1 billion by 2030. However, these estimates only apply to jurisdictions that fall under the bill’s scope. The rest, primarily smaller counties and municipalities, are unaffected, limiting the scale of relief and again reinforcing the two-tiered system.
In conclusion, while the intent of SB 10 is commendable, slowing the growth of local property taxes and increasing voter oversight, it ultimately falls short of delivering comprehensive, equitable, and structural tax reform. It provides selective relief, maintains exemptions for a wide swath of jurisdictions, and ignores spending growth altogether. For these reasons, the bill should be viewed as an incremental measure rather than a transformational one. In light of these shortcomings, and consistent with the recommendations made for similar legislation in the prior session, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on SB 10 and instead encourages them to pursue broader reforms that apply tax limits uniformly across all jurisdictions, impose meaningful spending caps, and lay the groundwork for long-term property tax reduction or elimination. Anything less is insufficient to meet the expectations of Texas taxpayers and the mandate for bold reform.