According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), HB 113 is not expected to have a significant financial impact on the state. The LBB states that any costs related to implementing the bill’s changes—primarily the new interpretive rules imposed on the judiciary—can be absorbed within existing agency resources, particularly within the Office of Court Administration and the Texas Judicial Council.

The bill primarily imposes procedural constraints on how Texas courts interpret statutes, particularly by prohibiting reliance on legislative intent, legislative history, and requiring strict textual interpretation. These changes do not necessitate new infrastructure, staffing, or ongoing state expenditures. Consequently, agencies responsible for supporting the judiciary are not expected to require additional appropriations to implement the reforms.

Similarly, there is no anticipated fiscal impact on local governments. Since the bill pertains to statutory interpretation standards rather than programmatic mandates or regulatory changes, its implementation does not impose new duties, costs, or responsibilities on counties, municipalities, or local courts.

Overall, the bill’s fiscal footprint is minimal, making it budget-neutral while still representing a significant policy shift in Texas jurisprudence.

HB 113 represents a meaningful shift in how Texas courts would interpret statutes, aiming to embed strict textualism into law. The bill reinforces the primacy of legislative text by prohibiting courts from relying on legislative intent, history, or agency interpretations when construing statutory language, except in limited contexts where historical meaning is relevant to understanding the text. These changes promote a clearer separation of powers and reaffirm that the legislature, not the judiciary or executive agencies, is the final authority on the content of the law.

From a liberty standpoint, the bill advances key principles. It promotes Limited Government by curbing judicial activism and preventing agencies from expanding statutory meaning through interpretation. It strengthens Private Property Rights and Free Enterprise by creating greater legal predictability and reducing the risk of interpretive drift that can expose individuals and businesses to unexpected liabilities. It also affirms Individual Liberty by rooting enforcement in democratically enacted language, not inferred purposes or unelected interpretations.

However, the bill’s current form raises practical and constitutional concerns about judicial flexibility. While most statutes can and should be interpreted by their plain text, situations do arise where the legislative history provides valuable clarification, especially when the statutory language is ambiguous, outdated, or uses undefined terms in a novel context. Completely prohibiting courts from consulting any legislative history, even to understand the ordinary public meaning of terms at the time of enactment, risks producing interpretations at odds with legislative purpose or constitutional values. While the committee substitute improves on the original bill by permitting historical context to define ordinary meaning, a modest amendment could provide more targeted flexibility.

Similarly, although the bill prohibits courts from deferring to agency interpretations, it rightly preserves their ability to consider those interpretations if they are reasonable and consistent with the statute’s plain language. This safeguard is appropriate and should be retained. Still, additional clarification could better define what qualifies as “reasonable” to ensure courts are not entirely barred from using agency guidance where statutes are complex or technical.

Finally, the bill repeals several longstanding interpretive canons that have served as useful, if non-binding, guideposts, such as the presumption that statutes aim for just, feasible, and constitutional outcomes. While these canons have occasionally supported expansive interpretations, they also serve a valuable role in promoting coherent, fair, and effective governance. A clarifying amendment could preserve judicial awareness of these values without granting them controlling authority.

In sum, HB 113 substantially supports liberty-aligned legal reforms by reinforcing legislative supremacy and textual clarity. Although it contains some rigidity that could be softened to prevent unintended consequences in edge cases, its core thrust is consistent with key liberty principles. For that reason, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote YES on HB 113 but also strongly recommends strengthening amendments that enhance its precision and practical effectiveness.

• Individual Liberty: The bill affirms the idea that individuals should be governed only by laws passed by their elected representatives, not by post-hoc interpretations from courts or agencies. By requiring that laws be interpreted strictly according to their original public meaning, it protects individuals from judicial activism or reinterpretation that could expand liability or limit rights beyond what the legislature intended. However, completely prohibiting courts from considering legislative history—even when the statute is ambiguous—may reduce the judiciary’s ability to interpret laws in a manner that protects civil rights or advances remedial legislative purposes. In some cases, the inability to reference context could impair courts’ ability to resolve ambiguous or outdated language in a way that safeguards individual liberties.
• Personal Responsibility: The bill does not directly affect the principle of personal responsibility, as it does not change the substance of laws governing personal conduct. However, to the extent that it fosters greater clarity in statutory meaning, individuals may benefit from clearer legal expectations, thereby reinforcing the idea that people are responsible for understanding and complying with the law as written.
• Free Enterprise: By curbing judicial and agency discretion, the bill reduces the risk that courts or regulators will reinterpret statutes in ways that create new obligations or liabilities for businesses. This promotes a stable legal environment and supports the rule of law—both essential components of a healthy free-market system. However, businesses operating in complex regulatory areas often rely on agency interpretations to guide compliance. The bill’s ban on judicial deference to agency interpretations could introduce uncertainty, especially in technical fields where statutes may not be self-explanatory. A narrow allowance for agency guidance that aligns with statutory text helps mitigate this, but concerns remain.
• Private Property Rights: The bill strengthens protections for property owners by insisting that statutes be applied strictly according to their text. This limits the possibility of courts or agencies expanding regulatory interpretations in ways that might infringe on property rights or impose unforeseen restrictions. By restraining governmental interpretation to what the law expressly says, the bill helps guard against regulatory takings or ambiguous land use restrictions.
• Limited Government: This is where the bill most clearly advances liberty principles. It limits the power of courts to infer meaning beyond the statutory text and bars agencies from expanding their authority through interpretation. It reinforces the separation of powers by making the judiciary an enforcer of legislative text, not an interpreter of legislative purpose or agency preference. This curtailment of interpretive discretion represents a substantive reassertion of legislative primacy in lawmaking.

• HB 4501 (Same As)
• SB 1796 (Similar To)