HB 115 revises Texas’s postconviction habeas corpus procedures to expand access to judicial relief for individuals convicted based on flawed or outdated scientific evidence. The bill updates Article 11.073 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, replacing the prior “preponderance of the evidence” standard with a “reasonable likelihood” test, making it easier for courts to grant habeas relief when new scientific developments cast doubt on a conviction or sentence. The bill also clarifies that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) must issue written opinions when denying such claims, ensuring greater transparency in decision-making.
Further, HB 115 amends Article 11.071, which governs habeas applications in death penalty cases, allowing the CCA to consider successive writs that fail to meet strict procedural requirements if the court finds that “justice requires” review. This provision grants the court broader discretion to review potentially meritorious claims even if they do not conform to traditional filing limitations.
The bill also creates Article 11.66, authorizing licensed Texas attorneys preparing a writ application to file a limited-purpose writ in district court to compel production of relevant documents when such records are necessary and not otherwise available. Relatedly, Section 24.011 of the Government Code is amended to affirm district judges’ authority to issue these writs. Finally, the bill includes transitional language making the new procedures applicable only to habeas applications filed on or after December 1, 2025.
The Committee Substitute to HB 115 retains the core objectives of the originally filed bill, reforming Texas’s postconviction habeas corpus framework, but introduces several refinements and clarifications to enhance the bill's legal precision, judicial guidance, and procedural functionality.
One of the most significant substantive changes is found in Article 11.073. In the originally filed version, the standard for relief was changed from requiring a court to find “by a preponderance of the evidence” that a person would not have been convicted, to a lower threshold: “a reasonable likelihood” that the scientific evidence could have affected the conviction or sentence. The committee substitute retains this change but modifies the language to make the new standard more clearly applicable and linguistically consistent with judicial review terminology.
Another key refinement appears in the new Article 11.66, which allows attorneys to file pre-application writs in district courts to obtain relevant documents necessary for preparing habeas applications. The original version of HB 115 introduced this provision with general parameters. The Committee Substitute, however, expands on the procedural safeguards and clarifies that only licensed attorneys representing postconviction clients may file such a writ and must give reasonable notice to the state. The substitute also makes clear the district court's limited jurisdiction under Article 11.66 to avoid overreach and ensure efficiency.
In Article 11.071, relating to death penalty habeas applications, both versions allow the Court of Criminal Appeals to consider subsequent applications if “justice requires.” The Committee Substitute provides better contextual framing for this discretionary authority by emphasizing the procedural steps that follow such a finding and affirming that the convicting court may act only after the appellate court makes such a determination.
Finally, the Committee Substitute improves consistency throughout the bill, including in Section 24.011 of the Government Code, by harmonizing language around writ powers and aligning statutory cross-references. These technical edits help streamline implementation and reduce interpretive ambiguity, while preserving the originally filed bill's intent to expand access to postconviction remedies grounded in scientific evidence and procedural fairness.