According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), the bill would result in a negative impact of $4.08 million to General Revenue funds for the 2026–2027 biennium, without appropriating funds directly but creating a framework for future appropriations.

The bill would establish the Texas Advanced Nuclear Energy Office (TANDO) within the Office of the Governor, which would require hiring 12 new full-time employees. The estimated cost for staffing, training, and operations over the initial biennium is projected at $3.38 million. Additionally, the Public Utility Commission (PUC) would need two new staff members and incur costs estimated at $690,147 for the same period.

More significantly, the bill establishes several new dedicated accounts and funding programs, including the Texas Advanced Nuclear Development Fund and a Completion Grant Program within the Texas Energy Fund. These programs would channel substantial amounts into nuclear development grants, although the fiscal note offsets this by showing that incoming revenue from redirected existing funds (like loan repayments and investment earnings) would match grant disbursements. Nevertheless, there is an annual administrative cost of $3 million tied to managing these funds, notably for contracting services.

While the bill anticipates that the Higher Education Coordinating Board and Texas Workforce Commission would absorb their duties within existing resources, it still creates significant fiscal obligations for the Office of the Governor and PUC. The structure is designed to scale over time and sunset in 2040, potentially capping long-term financial exposure. The fiscal impact highlights both the opportunity and cost of initiating a state-led framework to catalyze next-generation nuclear energy investment.

HB 14 reflects a commendable and timely recognition of Texas’s growing need for dispatchable, low-emission, and reliable electricity. By establishing the Texas Advanced Nuclear Energy Office within the Office of the Governor, the bill aims to position the state as a leader in advanced nuclear technologies—an effort that could diversify the energy grid, foster innovation, and enhance energy security. However, while the policy goals are sound and aligned with long-term public interests, the implementation mechanism raises significant concerns, and as such, Texas Policy Research has revised its vote recommendation for lawmakers to NO, unless amended as described below. 

Foremost among these concerns is the bill’s reliance on taxpayer-backed financial incentives. The bill authorizes the distribution of reimbursement-based grants for planning and constructing nuclear facilities, with a cap of up to $200 million per project. These grants, while conditioned on performance and limited to out-of-pocket expenses, represent a substantial expansion of government spending and involvement in a specific sector of the private economy. This risks undermining the principle of free enterprise and sets a precedent for other industries to seek similar subsidies—leading to potential policy creep and rent-seeking.

The bill’s creation of a new state office and workforce programs, while well-intentioned, also constitutes a long-term expansion of government scope. Although the office is scheduled to sunset in 2040, it authorizes new hiring, ongoing studies, advisory committee creation, and strategic planning—all funded by public dollars. Even with sunset provisions and clawbacks, the infrastructure created by the bill commits Texas to a form of industrial planning, albeit in a narrowly targeted sector. This may be at odds with a limited government philosophy that favors markets over mandates and decentralization over state management.

Critics of the bill also point out the opportunity cost. With Texas currently enjoying a significant budget surplus, many fiscal conservatives argue those funds should be returned to taxpayers through property tax relief—not distributed as project-based grants to corporations, regardless of the public benefit of nuclear energy. If the state wants to encourage nuclear investment, it could do so more efficiently by removing regulatory barriers, streamlining permitting processes, and working with federal agencies to delegate or reduce duplicative oversight.

To better align the bill with liberty principles and fiscal responsibility, several amendments should be considered.

Suggested Amendments:

• Eliminate All Reimbursement-Based Grant Programs: Strike provisions authorizing reimbursement grants from the Texas Advanced Nuclear Development Fund and the Texas Energy Fund. Remove the Project Development and Supply Chain Reimbursement Program and the Advanced Nuclear Construction Reimbursement Program. Remove the Completion Grant Program under the Public Utility Commission. These changes avoid taxpayer-funded corporate subsidies and reduce the risk of rent-seeking behavior or crony capitalism.
• Retain and Refocus the Texas Advanced Nuclear Energy Office: Maintain the office within the Office of the Governor, but limit its role to strategic policy coordination, public education and outreach, and permitting assistance and regulatory navigation. These changes would keep the state’s role facilitative rather than financial or directive.
• Add Regulatory Reform Provisions: Include provisions directing the office to identify redundant or burdensome local/state regulations on nuclear facilities, recommend statutory changes to reduce permitting timelines, and work with the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission on cooperative agreements to simplify oversight. These changes would focus on deregulation instead of government spending as the primary tool to support industry growth.
• Remove or Tighten the Nuclear Workforce Development Mandates: Make participation in the workforce development program voluntary and explicitly private-sector driven. Eliminate state-directed curriculum requirements and focus instead on partnerships between industry and institutions of higher education. These changes would reduce the role of government in education planning and avoid central planning of labor pipelines.
• Include Language Preventing Double-Dipping or Regulatory Arbitrage: Strengthen existing language that prohibits recipients from receiving other federal, state, or local incentives for the same project expenses. Add audit requirements for any expenditures facilitated through the office, if any limited financial support is retained. These changes would enhance fiscal accountability and ensure that market discipline is preserved.
• Shorten or Tighten the Sunset Provision: Move the sunset date from 2040 to 2030 or require the legislature to reauthorize the office every biennium after an independent performance audit. These changes would ensure ongoing legislative oversight and prevent unnecessary bureaucratic permanence.
• Add Legislative Oversight Mechanisms: Require annual reporting to the Legislature with detailed metrics on office activities, industry outcomes, and recommendations. Create a joint interim committee to review the impact of the office and propose reforms. These changes would provide checks and balances and prevent bureaucratic mission creep.

A restructured version of the bill could maintain its core goals while avoiding the risks of state-managed investment and corporate favoritism.

In conclusion, while HB 14 addresses a vital policy area and is grounded in legitimate state interests, its current form relies too heavily on taxpayer-funded incentives and institutional expansion. The bill should be amended to remove financial entitlements and narrow its scope, after which it could become a model for limited-government facilitation of clean energy development.

• Individual Liberty: The bill does not infringe upon or directly enhance personal freedoms. It does not regulate individual behavior or restrict personal choices. Its focus is on facilitating infrastructure and energy development. However, to the extent that reliable energy contributes to personal and economic freedom, especially during grid emergencies, there is a potential indirect benefit to individual liberty. Still, those gains are not realized through liberty-enhancing reforms, but rather through state-directed infrastructure coordination.
• Personal Responsibility: The bill may unintentionally undercut the principle of personal and institutional responsibility by substituting market-driven investment with publicly backed reimbursements. The availability of state grants for project costs could reduce the incentive for private developers to fully bear the financial risks of their ventures. While the bill includes performance-based conditions, this still represents a shift of responsibility from private entities to the taxpayer.
• Free Enterprise: The bill aims to facilitate private-sector nuclear investment, which on its face promotes free enterprise. However, it does so through state-administered financial incentives, which could distort market competition. By offering substantial reimbursements to select companies, the state risks engaging in corporate favoritism, where winners are picked not by consumers or innovation, but by political or administrative mechanisms. While the nuclear industry is burdened by federal overregulation, the bill does little to remove those barriers, and instead supplements them with state subsidies—an approach at odds with free-market principles.
• Private Property Rights: There are no direct takings, zoning changes, or restrictions that would affect private property. The bill does not modify land use law or impose eminent domain provisions. However, indirect effects, such as incentivized siting or infrastructure development, could influence regional land use decisions. Still, these effects are typical of industrial investment and do not inherently infringe on property rights.
• Limited Government: This is where the bill diverges most significantly from liberty principles. It creates a new state office, a dedicated fund, and multi-million-dollar reimbursement programs. While time-limited and conditioned on performance, these programs nonetheless expand the scope and function of the state. Government takes on the role of strategic investor and facilitator, which may be appropriate in some crisis contexts, but not consistent with a philosophy of small, constitutionally restrained government. A limited government approach would emphasize deregulation, permitting reform, and private capital formation, not public grants and programmatic offices.

• SB 2060 (Same As)