According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), HB 1828 is not expected to have a significant fiscal impact on the state. The legislation enables correctional officers at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) to voluntarily donate up to eight hours of accrued compensatory or annual leave per year to a legislative leave pool, and allows eligible officers to use that time for association-related legislative activities.

The LBB assumes that any administrative costs associated with establishing and managing the legislative leave pool, such as tracking contributions, coordinating with associations, and implementing procedures, can be absorbed by TDCJ using existing agency resources. No new appropriations or additional staffing are anticipated as a result of the bill’s implementation.

Likewise, the bill is projected to have no significant fiscal impact on local governments, as it applies exclusively to state-level correctional officers employed by TDCJ and does not create mandates or costs for county or municipal jurisdictions.

HB 1828 proposes the creation of a legislative leave pool for correctional officers employed by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ). Under the bill, these officers could voluntarily donate up to eight hours of accrued compensatory or annual leave each year for use in legislative advocacy efforts. Officers who are members of large, structured employment-related associations would be eligible to withdraw from this pool, subject to rules set by the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, for the purpose of participating in legislative leave activities. While the bill mirrors provisions already in place for other law enforcement personnel, its underlying structure raises significant concerns related to government neutrality, taxpayer accountability, and the influence of public-sector associations in state policymaking.

At its core, the bill blurs the line between personal civic participation and state-endorsed political activity. Although the time used comes from accrued personal leave, the fact that this activity occurs within an administratively sanctioned framework introduces the perception—if not the reality—of indirect taxpayer support for advocacy. Correctional officers on legislative leave are still compensated through accrued leave benefits, and the bill requires the state to manage and approve the process. This creates a formal mechanism through which the state facilitates political advocacy by its employees. Even if no additional taxpayer funds are spent, the administrative infrastructure and legitimization of this process challenge the principle that public service should remain neutral and free from organized lobbying influence.

Furthermore, the bill gives formal recognition and privileged access to employee associations that meet specific thresholds (e.g., 5,000 members and a board of directors). This threshold appears designed to benefit large associations, which in practice often operate similarly to public-sector unions. While Texas has long resisted granting collective bargaining rights to state employees, this bill may serve as a conduit for increasing the legislative influence of public-sector associations under the protection of a statutorily authorized benefit. For lawmakers and stakeholders concerned about growing union-style influence in Texas government, this provision represents a subtle but significant shift.

There is also the risk of precedent. Granting this privilege to correctional officers, regardless of whether the fiscal impact is currently minimal, opens the door for similar demands from other classes of state employees. Over time, this could lead to a proliferation of legislative leave pools across agencies, each requiring administrative oversight, coordination with associations, and rulemaking authority. While the fiscal note states that HB 1828 will not incur significant costs at this time, expansion of similar provisions could increase administrative burdens and normalize a new form of indirect lobbying support embedded within state employment systems.

Finally, the bill undermines a core tenet of limited government: that public institutions and the use of public resources must remain focused on service delivery, not advocacy. While civic engagement is essential in a free society, it should take place outside the bounds of compensated time and beyond the infrastructure of the state. HB 1828 effectively uses the state’s internal mechanisms to facilitate advocacy by its own employees—a move that is misaligned with the principle of government neutrality.

Though HB 1828 is well-intentioned in offering correctional officers parity with other public safety professionals, it ultimately institutionalizes a mechanism for advocacy that compromises government neutrality, invites expansion of similar practices, and increases the influence of public-sector associations in the legislative process. These implications, combined with principled concerns over the use of state-administered resources for political purposes, are why Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HB 1828.

• Individual Liberty: On the surface, the bill supports individual liberty by giving correctional officers the voluntary option to use their earned leave to engage in the legislative process. It allows them to associate with employment-related organizations and advocate for workplace or public policy issues. This can be viewed as an enhancement of First Amendment rights, such as free speech and freedom of association. However, when this liberty is facilitated through a state-administered mechanism, particularly in the context of state employment, it raises concerns. By institutionalizing a process for politically motivated leave within government operations, the bill risks creating preferential structures for specific viewpoints or associations. This potentially undermines the broader principle of government neutrality in relation to individual liberties.
• Personal Responsibility: The bill preserves some elements of personal responsibility by making participation in the legislative leave pool entirely voluntary. Correctional officers must choose to donate their own accrued leave time and must coordinate with their association’s leadership to use time from the pool. This supports the idea that individuals should be accountable for how they use their benefits and time. However, the personal responsibility principle is weakened when the state plays a role in facilitating compensated advocacy during official working hours. Even if the time is earned, having the state oversee and process leave for political purposes creates a blurred accountability structure that softens the traditional boundary between personal initiative and institutional endorsement.
• Free Enterprise: The bill has no direct effect on private markets, business regulation, or economic competition. It pertains exclusively to public-sector employment policy within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. However, indirect concerns could arise if similar mechanisms are replicated across other sectors of state government, potentially increasing public-sector lobbying that favors regulation or appropriations opposed by market-oriented actors.
• Private Property Rights: The bill does not affect ownership, use, or transfer of private property. It neither restricts nor expands government authority in areas related to land use, property seizure, or individual economic rights. This principle is not meaningfully engaged by the legislation.
• Limited Government: This is where the bill most clearly conflicts with a core liberty principle. By creating a statutory framework for legislative leave within a state agency it expands the administrative responsibilities of the government. Even though the bill does not appropriate new funding, it introduces a new state-managed function that facilitates political advocacy among public employees—an activity that traditionally occurs outside official government channels. Moreover, the bill formalizes the role of large employee associations in determining who may participate in the legislative leave program. This raises concerns that certain groups—especially those resembling public-sector unions—are being given a privileged pathway to influence legislation from within the public payroll. These structural changes undermine the ideal that government should be lean, neutral, and restricted to its core functions.