HB 223

Overall Vote Recommendation
No
Principle Criteria
positive
Free Enterprise
neutral
Property Rights
neutral
Personal Responsibility
negative
Limited Government
neutral
Individual Liberty
Digest
HB 223 proposes an amendment to Section 252.022(a) of the Texas Local Government Code to eliminate an existing exemption that allows municipalities to enter into contracts for lobbying, government relations, or similar services without undergoing competitive procurement. Under current law, municipalities can classify these services as “professional services” and are thus not required to follow competitive bidding or proposal procedures. This bill would remove that carve-out, requiring municipalities to competitively procure such services under Chapter 252 unless another exemption applies.

Specifically, the bill distinguishes lobbying and government relations from other professional services like legal, medical, or planning services, which remain exempt from competitive bidding. The proposed change is aimed at increasing transparency and accountability in how municipalities spend public funds on advocacy efforts intended to influence legislation or regulation at the state or federal level.

The bill does not prohibit municipalities from hiring lobbyists or consultants for government relations but would require those contracts to go through a competitive selection process. The change would apply only to contracts signed on or after the effective date of the bill. This delayed effective date gives municipalities time to adapt their procurement processes to comply with the new requirement.

The originally filed version of HB 223 and the Committee Substitute both aim to address the same policy objective: requiring municipalities to competitively procure contracts for lobbying, government relations, or similar services that are intended to influence state or federal lawmakers. However, the language and structure of how they accomplish this goal differ in important ways.

In the originally filed bill, the legislative change is accomplished by adding an exception clause within an existing exemption. Specifically, it retains the exemption for "personal, professional, or planning services," but inserts a carve-out stating that this does not include lobbying, government relations, or similar services. The effect is to narrow the definition of what constitutes an exempt “professional service,” rather than directly listing lobbying services as subject to procurement laws.

By contrast, the Committee Substitute takes a more direct and explicit approach. It completely rewrites the exemption for professional services by removing the blanket exemption for lobbying, government relations, or similar services from the list of professional services exempt from Chapter 252.022(a). Instead of relying on a parenthetical exclusion, the revised language clearly states that lobbying and similar services are not included among exempted services, thereby making it more apparent that such contracts must go through the standard procurement process.

In summary, the substance of the policy remains unchanged between the original and substitute bills—both remove lobbying-related services from municipal no-bid contract exemptions—but the Committee Substitute improves the clarity and legal precision of that policy.
Author (4)
Giovanni Capriglione
Carl Tepper
David Spiller
Daniel Alders
Co-Author (1)
Richard Hayes
Sponsor (1)
Mayes Middleton
Co-Sponsor (2)
Donna Campbell
Lois Kolkhorst
Fiscal Notes

According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), HB 223 is not expected to have any fiscal impact on the state. The bill mandates that municipalities use a competitive procurement process for hiring lobbying, government relations, or similar services, but it does not impose any new administrative duties on state agencies or require state funding for compliance or oversight.

At the local level, the LBB anticipates no significant fiscal impact on municipalities. Although municipalities may need to adjust procurement procedures for these services, such changes are considered routine administrative adjustments and are not expected to require substantial new resources. Municipal governments already conduct competitive bidding for a wide range of other services, and the infrastructure to handle such processes is generally in place.

Overall, while the bill may slightly increase administrative steps for municipalities when procuring lobbying-related services, these costs are expected to be minimal and manageable within existing budgets. The bill aims more at enhancing transparency and oversight rather than generating savings or imposing costs, and its fiscal effect is therefore neutral at both stthe ate and local levels.

Vote Recommendation Notes

HB 223 aims to bring greater transparency and oversight to how municipalities procure lobbying, government relations, and similar services by subjecting those contracts to competitive bidding requirements under Chapter 252 of the Local Government Code. Currently, such services are exempt under a broader allowance for personal or professional services, allowing municipal governments to engage lobbyists without competition or public scrutiny. The bill seeks to correct this by removing that exemption, effectively requiring open solicitation and review for future contracts starting September 1, 2025.

While the intent to improve transparency and reduce favoritism in municipal procurement is commendable, this bill ultimately stops short of meaningful reform. By continuing to allow municipalities to use taxpayer dollars to fund lobbying efforts—albeit through a competitive process—HB 223 risks legitimizing and further institutionalizing a practice that many Texans fundamentally oppose. The heart of the issue is not merely how lobbying contracts are awarded, but whether taxpayer-funded lobbying should be permitted at all.

Taxpayer-funded lobbying often places local governments in the position of using public resources to advocate for policies that may be contrary to the interests or values of their constituents. This includes lobbying for increased regulatory authority, higher local taxes or fees, or expanded powers that reduce state oversight. In such cases, residents are essentially paying for the privilege of being politically opposed with their own money. It is an inherent conflict of interest and a distortion of representative government. Public funds should not be used to influence legislation—especially when that influence may not reflect the will of the taxpayers providing the funds.

Moreover, allowing municipalities to hire lobbyists—even through a transparent bidding process—does not prevent the underlying misuse of public funds. It simply regulates it. This approach could even be counterproductive, by giving the appearance that the problem has been “fixed” through procedural reform, while the core concern remains unresolved: taxpayer money is still being used to engage in lobbying activities. This creates the risk that future efforts to fully eliminate the practice will be blunted or delayed under the assumption that HB 223 has already “cleaned up” the issue.

From a liberty-oriented perspective, this bill does not grow the size of government or impose new taxes or mandates on individuals or businesses. However, it also fails to restrain the government in a meaningful way. It leaves intact a mechanism through which public entities can lobby for expanded powers and increased funding, eroding the principle of limited government. True reform would prohibit all forms of taxpayer-funded lobbying, whether direct or through hired consultants, while still allowing public officials themselves to engage in advocacy as part of their duties—a critical distinction.

For these reasons, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HB 223. While the bill attempts to improve oversight, it ultimately preserves and legitimizes taxpayer-funded lobbying. A better legislative approach would be to ban the use of public funds for outside lobbying contracts altogether, ensuring that taxpayer dollars are spent on essential services, not political influence campaigns. Until such comprehensive reform is enacted, any measure that falls short risks reinforcing a flawed system rather than dismantling it.

  • Individual Liberty: The bill does not directly enhance or restrict individual rights such as free speech, privacy, or due process. However, by requiring transparency in how public money is used for lobbying, it could indirectly bolster individual liberty by making it easier for citizens to hold their local governments accountable for spending decisions. When citizens know how their tax dollars are being used—especially to influence state or federal policy—they are better equipped to exercise political oversight.
  • Personal Responsibility: This principle generally refers to the idea that individuals and institutions should be accountable for their actions. The bill mildly reinforces municipal accountability by requiring formal bidding procedures for lobbying contracts. However, it stops short of requiring municipalities to justify whether such lobbying is even an appropriate use of taxpayer funds. Thus, it does not fully support the kind of fiscal restraint and responsibility that this principle entails.
  • Free Enterprise: Requiring municipalities to competitively bid lobbying and government relations contracts may marginally expand access to these opportunities for a broader array of firms. Currently, no-bid contracts can favor politically connected firms, distorting the market. By mandating competition, the bill levels the playing field for service providers. That said, this benefit is limited because it pertains only to a narrow class of government contracts.
  • Private Property Rights: This bill does not affect land use, property ownership, or regulatory takings. Therefore, it has no direct impact on private property rights.
  • Limited Government: This principle is the most directly implicated—and most conflicted—by the bill. On one hand, requiring open bidding improves procedural transparency and may reduce the misuse of public funds. On the other hand, the bill continues to allow taxpayer-funded lobbying, which many advocates of limited government argue is fundamentally incompatible with that principle. It enables local governments to use public funds to advocate for expanded authority, higher taxes, or regulations, often in opposition to the interests of the very taxpayers funding the lobbying. By stopping short of prohibiting such contracts entirely, the bill arguably entrenches a practice that undermines limited government in the long term.
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