89th Legislature Regular Session

HB 3073

Overall Vote Recommendation
No
Principle Criteria
Free Enterprise
Property Rights
Personal Responsibility
Limited Government
Individual Liberty
Digest

HB 3073 proposes substantive amendments to Section 22.011(b) of the Texas Penal Code, redefining the conditions under which sexual activity is considered to occur without the consent of the other party. The bill seeks to broaden the legal definition of “without consent” by adding new scenarios and refining existing ones. Key changes include expanding the criteria to include situations where the actor knows the victim is unaware the assault is occurring, where the victim is too intoxicated or impaired to consent (regardless of who administered the substance), and where the actor is in a position of authority or trust — such as a healthcare provider, public servant, coach, tutor, or caregiver — and exploits that relationship to engage in sexual activity.

The legislation also introduces an explicit statutory definition of “consent” by referencing Section 1.07 of the Penal Code, reinforcing the legal standard that consent must be a voluntary, informed agreement to engage in sexual conduct. Notably, the bill includes protections for victims who may withdraw consent during the encounter, making it unlawful for the actor to continue under those circumstances. Additional clarifications include coverage for individuals who are unconscious or mentally incapable of understanding or resisting the act.

HB 3073 specifies that these amendments will apply only to offenses committed on or after its effective date of September 1, 2025. This provision ensures compliance with due process requirements and protects against retroactive application. Overall, the bill modernizes Texas’s sexual assault statute to better reflect contemporary understandings of consent, coercion, and power dynamics in abusive relationships. It aims to improve protections for vulnerable populations and enhance clarity and enforceability for law enforcement and the judicial system.

The originally filed version of House Bill 3073 and the Committee Substitute both amend Section 22.011(b) of the Texas Penal Code to update and clarify when sexual activity is considered non-consensual. However, the Committee Substitute introduces several key refinements and structural reorganizations that further sharpen the law’s language and broaden its applicability in targeted ways.

One notable difference is the reorganization and cleanup of statutory clauses for clarity. The original bill struck some duplicative or outdated language (e.g., references to the actor impairing the victim's conduct through substance use without their knowledge) and combined multiple conditions under which a person is deemed unable to consent. The Committee Substitute retains this consolidation but adds language to ensure that both actual and reasonably perceivable states of impairment (e.g., intoxication) are included, strengthening the legal basis for prosecution in those cases.

Another key addition in the Committee Substitute is the broader scope of professional and trust-based relationships in which exploitation invalidates consent. While the original bill already included health care providers, clergy, and caregivers, the substitute adds new categories such as coaches, tutors, and caregivers assisting with daily life activities. It also introduces language clarifying exploitation in the context of spiritual or emotional dependency more precisely.

Structurally, the Committee Substitute includes clearer and more explicit references to the Penal Code’s general definition of "consent" (Section 1.07), which the original bill also added but with less emphasis. Moreover, the substitute omits the proposed amendment to the Occupations Code found in Section 3 of the original bill—this related to timelines for complaints involving misconduct by health care providers—which has been dropped in the committee substitute.

In short, while both versions share the same foundational goal—to modernize and expand protections against non-consensual sexual activity—the committee substitute version offers a more comprehensive, cleaner, and arguably more enforceable framework for recognizing situations in which consent is absent. It reflects both legal refinement and broader stakeholder input following committee review.

Author
Donna Howard
Ellen Troxclair
Ann Johnson
David Cook
Nicole Collier
Co-Author
Salman Bhojani
Maria Flores
Suleman Lalani
Trey Martinez Fischer
Penny Morales Shaw
Mihaela Plesa
Ana-Maria Ramos
Sponsor
Angela Paxton
Co-Sponsor
Carol Alvarado
Sarah Eckhardt
Brent Hagenbuch
Jose Menendez
Judith Zaffirini
Fiscal Notes

According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), HB 3073 is not anticipated to have a significant fiscal impact on the State of Texas. The bill amends provisions of the Penal Code to expand the circumstances in which a sexual assault is considered non-consensual, including when the actor knows or reasonably should know that the victim is incapacitated, unaware of the assault, has withdrawn consent, or is too intoxicated to consent.

Although the bill could theoretically increase the number of prosecutions or convictions due to the expanded definitions, the fiscal analysis concludes that any associated state revenue impact from fines, court fees, or administrative processing would not be significant. This assessment is based on the assumption that changes in case volume would be relatively marginal or would be absorbed within existing system capacity.

Similarly, local governments are not expected to face substantial financial burdens as a result of the legislation. The fiscal note indicates that any local impact related to enforcement, prosecution, supervision, or incarceration would be minimal and manageable with current resources​.

In sum, HB 3073 advances important statutory reforms in defining sexual assault without imposing meaningful costs on state or local budgets. The fiscal outlook supports the feasibility of the bill’s implementation without additional appropriations.

Vote Recommendation Notes

HB 3073 seeks to address the real and serious issue of sexual assault by clarifying when sexual activity is considered non-consensual under Texas law. The bill expands existing definitions in the Penal Code to include additional scenarios—such as when a person is too intoxicated to consent or has withdrawn consent during the act—and aims to reflect a broader understanding of how coercion and incapacitation impact an individual's ability to meaningfully agree to sexual contact. These goals are honorable and the intent is understandable, especially in light of recommendations from the Sexual Assault Survivors' Task Force and the ongoing challenges in prosecuting such offenses effectively.

However, while well-intentioned, the bill raises significant concerns regarding legal precision, due process protections, and the scope of criminal liability. Most notably, the use of subjective language—such as whether the actor “reasonably should know” the other person cannot consent due to intoxication—introduces ambiguity into a criminal statute that carries severe penalties. Criminal laws must be drafted with exacting clarity to ensure that individuals have fair notice of what conduct is prohibited and to prevent arbitrary or uneven enforcement. The lack of clear, objective standards in some of the bill’s new provisions may lead to unjust outcomes or overly broad prosecutions, particularly in cases involving minimal evidence or complicated interpersonal dynamics.

The bill also omits complementary safeguards for the accused, despite broadening the grounds on which someone can be charged with sexual assault. It does not provide guidance on how courts or juries should evaluate claims of impaired consent or withdrawal of consent mid-act—especially in cases where intent or awareness is contested. In practice, this could make it more difficult for innocent individuals to defend themselves against serious accusations. While the desire to support victims is entirely justified, expanding criminal liability without also reinforcing procedural protections creates a potential imbalance in the justice system.

Furthermore, HB 3073, while not growing the administrative size of government or imposing financial burdens on taxpayers, does increase the practical scope of government authority in criminal law. It extends the reach of prosecutorial power without clear boundaries, which runs counter to the principle of limited government. Lawmakers with a strong preference for tightly constrained state power in criminal matters may view this bill as an example of legislative overreach—even if its motivation is rooted in compassion.

The bill does not impose regulatory burdens on businesses or private institutions, and it does not carry significant fiscal implications according to the Legislative Budget Board. However, these points alone do not justify endorsing legislation that alters foundational criminal standards without sufficient safeguards or legal clarity. When expanding the scope of a serious criminal offense like sexual assault, the law must be written in a way that is both fair to victims and consistent with constitutional protections for the accused.

In conclusion, while HB 3073 addresses a deeply important and emotional issue, it does so in a way that compromises due process, opens the door to vague legal interpretations, and increases the risk of wrongful prosecutions. Justice for victims must not come at the expense of fairness and legal precision. For these reasons, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HB 3073.

  • HB 3073 seeks to strengthen the protection of individual liberty by ensuring people are not subjected to sexual acts without valid consent. It extends safeguards to individuals who are unconscious, intoxicated, or otherwise unable to give meaningful agreement. However, the bill’s use of ambiguous legal standards (e.g., “reasonably should know”) could inadvertently infringe on the liberty of those accused of sexual assault by creating uncertainty in the application of criminal law. This tension highlights a tradeoff between protecting bodily autonomy and preserving due process rights.
  • The bill promotes personal responsibility by setting a higher standard for individuals to ensure that their partner is capable of and has clearly given consent. It emphasizes that consent must be conscious, voluntary, and ongoing. This aligns with the principle that people are responsible for their conduct and should not exploit impaired or vulnerable individuals. However, the bill's broader definitions may place increased legal responsibility on individuals to assess another person’s mental or physical state in complex situations, which could raise questions about fairness when intent is unclear.
  • HB 3073 has no direct effect on economic activity or the operations of private businesses. It does not impose any new regulations, compliance costs, or legal obligations on employers, industries, or commercial transactions. As such, the bill is neutral with respect to the principle of free enterprise.
  • This legislation does not impact property ownership, land use, or any regulatory policies tied to private property. Since the bill pertains solely to criminal conduct related to personal interactions, it neither infringes upon nor enhances protections for property rights. It remains neutral in this area.
  • The bill potentially conflicts with the principle of limited government by expanding the conditions under which the state can pursue criminal charges for sexual assault. While it does not create new agencies or impose fiscal costs, it broadens prosecutorial discretion and lowers the threshold for criminal culpability in some cases. This expansion of state authority—especially through subjective legal language—raises concerns about overreach and the erosion of clearly defined limits on government power in the criminal justice system.
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