According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), HB 3425 is not expected to have a significant fiscal impact on the State of Texas. The legislation expands the scope of criminal offenses related to the unlawful disclosure of personal information—such as home addresses and phone numbers—by including electronic communications made with the intent to cause harm or threaten specific individuals, particularly public servants and their families.

The analysis assumes that any resulting increase in state expenditures—such as costs associated with prosecution, adjudication, or incarceration—would be minimal and manageable within existing agency resources. While HB 3425 potentially increases the number of prosecutions under expanded definitions of criminal conduct, the number of such cases is not expected to be large enough to create a meaningful demand on state correctional systems or judicial resources.

Similarly, local governments are not anticipated to face significant costs related to the enforcement or prosecution of the offenses outlined in the bill. Expenses associated with law enforcement activity, pre-trial detention, supervision, or incarceration at the county level are expected to be minor. Overall, the bill’s fiscal impact is characterized as negligible for both state and local governments.

While well-intentioned, HB 3425 raises several red flags for those of us committed to safeguarding individual liberty, limiting government power, and preserving the integrity of free speech. The bill expands the reach of criminal law into the realm of digital communication, setting a precedent that could be weaponized or misapplied over time.

First and foremost, the bill walks a fine line around First Amendment protections. While it targets speech with “intent to cause harm,” this standard is inherently subjective and opens the door to overbroad interpretations. In politically charged environments, criticism of public officials—especially when it includes publicly available contact information—could be mischaracterized as retaliation. This creates a chilling effect on dissent and robust political discourse.

Second, the bill introduces a “prima facie” presumption of intent based on failure to remove information within 48 hours after receiving a written demand. This flips a core tenet of due process by placing the burden on the accused to prove benign intent, rather than on the state to prove malicious purpose beyond a reasonable doubt. The potential for abuse or misapplication is significant.

Moreover, HB 3425 subtly expands the scope of government authority without any corresponding oversight or limiting principle. It creates new prosecutable offenses without adding clarity to existing law enforcement tools, such as harassment or stalking statutes. The risk of future scope creep or reliance on vague standards in digital contexts should give any advocate of limited government serious pause.

This bill also exemplifies the overuse of criminal law when civil remedies could suffice. If someone believes they’ve been harmed by the release of their private information, they can already pursue civil action under privacy torts. Resorting to state prosecution, jail time, or criminal records for speech-based misconduct should always be a last resort, not a first-line policy.

For these reasons, and in defense of a minimalist state, free speech, and individual due process protections, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HB 3425.

• Individual Liberty: The bill criminalizes certain forms of speech, specifically the electronic communication of a person’s address or phone number when allegedly intended to cause harm. While this aims to protect individuals from harassment, it simultaneously restricts speech based on its perceived intent. For those who value strong First Amendment protections, this sets a troubling precedent. “Intent to cause harm” is subjective and difficult to prove or disprove, meaning speech could be chilled even in cases where it’s lawful but controversial or politically charged. That threat to expression, especially involving public servants, is a direct tension with the principle of individual liberty.
• Personal Responsibility: On one hand, the bill encourages people not to use digital tools to intimidate or retaliate, which aligns with the principle that individuals should be accountable for their actions. On the other hand, the “prima facie evidence” provision, where a person is presumed to have harmful intent if they don’t remove content within 48 hours, shifts the burden of proof and may punish individuals based on inaction, not deliberate conduct. That undermines the ideal of responsibility by imposing liability for potentially ambiguous or misunderstood actions.
• Free Enterprise: The bill doesn’t directly regulate businesses, but it could create indirect pressure on online platforms and service providers to act as private censors. If businesses face legal exposure for hosting user content, especially if they miss a takedown deadline, they may preemptively over-censor to reduce liability. This raises concerns about private sector compliance with government-driven standards of speech moderation, especially in political contexts.
• Private Property Rights: The bill reinforces informational privacy in the digital sphere, which could be seen as an extension of one's control over personal information. However, it does so through punitive state enforcement rather than through voluntary agreements or civil remedies. For those who view property rights as tied to voluntary consent and contractual resolution, this reliance on criminal prosecution might be seen as heavy-handed or incompatible with a free society’s norms of resolving disputes.
• Limited Government: The bill expands the reach of the criminal justice system into new areas of digital expression. It increases the list of criminalized behaviors, broadens prosecutorial discretion, and adds a statutory presumption of guilt-like intent. While no new agencies are created, the bill adds legal complexity and potential for prosecutorial overreach, running counter to the principle of limited, restrained government. Critics would argue that the state should not be involved in regulating non-violent digital conduct that could instead be addressed through civil court remedies or existing anti-harassment laws.