89th Legislature

HB 36

Overall Vote Recommendation
No
Principle Criteria
Free Enterprise
Property Rights
Personal Responsibility
Limited Government
Individual Liberty
Digest
HB 36, titled the Sharon Radebaugh Family Violence Protection Act, is a comprehensive legislative proposal aimed at improving protections for victims of family violence in Texas by enhancing judicial tools and offender monitoring practices. The bill is named the Sharon Radebaugh Family Violence Protection Act and reflects a broader statewide effort to address repeat family violence offenses and increase the accountability of alleged offenders during pretrial release.

The bill amends Articles 17.292 and 17.49 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to expand the conditions under which magistrates can impose electronic monitoring, including Global Positioning Monitoring Systems (GPS). It authorizes and, in certain cases, mandates the use of GPS devices for defendants accused of family violence when the court determines that the individual poses a continuing threat to the victim. Such determinations are based on criteria such as prior violations of protective orders, previous convictions involving violence or firearms, or a documented history of threats or abuse.

HB 36 also enables victims, upon consent and with full disclosure of associated risks and limitations, to receive electronic notifications when a monitored defendant approaches prohibited areas such as the victim’s home, workplace, or other designated safe zones. Additionally, the bill prohibits offenders from tracking a victim's personal property or vehicle without consent and includes technological safeguards to prevent stalking through digital means. The legislation further strengthens data collection requirements for courts and magistrates, compelling reporting on bond conditions and monitoring outcomes in family violence cases to better inform future policy decisions.

Overall, the bill aims to balance victim safety with responsible pretrial monitoring practices, using modern technology to deter future violence and support enforcement of protective orders.

The originally filed version of HB 36 and the Committee Substitute share the same overall purpose—enhancing protections for victims of family violence through expanded monitoring of offenders and stronger enforcement mechanisms. However, the substitute version refines and restructures several provisions to address policy concerns, clarify implementation mechanisms, and possibly improve the bill’s chances of passage.

One of the most notable differences is in the definition of when mandatory GPS monitoring must be imposed. In the originally filed bill, Article 17.49(b-1) mandates that a magistrate impose GPS monitoring if a defendant has a history of any one of four broad categories: violations of Title 5 offenses, improper firearm use, violating prior protective orders, or making threats. The committee substitute maintains the structure but slightly refines the threshold, particularly by removing the "firearm use" criterion and limiting mandatory application to defendants posing a “continuing threat,” thereby narrowing the scope of mandatory monitoring to reduce overreach concerns.

In addition, the substitute appears to provide greater detail in procedural protections for victims, such as informing them of their rights to opt in or out of monitoring, the risks of technology, and available support services. These procedural enhancements appear consistent across both versions but are streamlined and restructured for clarity in the substitute version.

Another difference involves structural organization and statutory placement. The original bill added new subsections to Section 85.022 of the Family Code and created an entirely new Chapter 94 to establish a DPS-administered victim services database. These provisions remain in the substitute, but there are subtle refinements in language and possibly in administrative details (e.g., how quickly orders must be transmitted or how law enforcement agencies must respond).

Finally, the reporting requirements to the Department of Public Safety and updates to the Government Code (Section 411.042) remain in both versions, but the substitute makes technical improvements to formatting, timelines, and data points (such as adding new identifiers and clarifying the interface between bond conditions and law enforcement systems).

In summary, the substitute is more polished than the originally filed HB 36, with a few narrowed requirements for mandatory GPS monitoring, improved procedural safeguards, and better clarity for administrative implementation, all while preserving the original bill’s intent to protect victims and strengthen accountability in family violence cases.
Author
Rhetta Bowers
Alma Allen
Toni Rose
Lacey Hull
James Talarico
Co-Author
Rafael Anchia
Angie Chen Button
Aicha Davis
Maria Flores
Vikki Goodwin
Venton Jones
Suleman Lalani
Terri Leo-Wilson
Janie Lopez
Penny Morales Shaw
Eddie Morales
Claudia Ordaz
Mihaela Plesa
Fiscal Notes

According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), the fiscal implications of HB 36 are projected to result in a negative impact of approximately $2.15 million on the General Revenue Fund over the 2026–2027 biennium, primarily due to new responsibilities placed on the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). The bill mandates DPS to administer a victim assistance program, develop and maintain a searchable database of victim services, and manage real-time GPS-based notification systems when bond conditions are violated. These duties require new personnel, technology upgrades, and recurring operational expenses.

To meet the bill’s mandates, DPS would need eight new full-time positions, including IT specialists, program specialists, and a manager. The estimated staffing costs are around $1.12 million in fiscal year 2026 and $810,531 annually thereafter. These positions will oversee victim notifications, support services, and data management related to conditions of bond and protective orders.

A one-time technology investment of $218,272 in FY 2026 will be needed to upgrade the Texas Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (TLETS) and the Texas Crime Information Center (TCIC) so that they can process GPS violation alerts and integrate the data into law enforcement systems statewide.

The fiscal note also clarifies that while no significant local government impact is anticipated, the expansion of grant programs through the Office of the Governor may help offset local costs related to monitoring equipment. However, the overall effect on state correctional populations remains undetermined due to uncertainty about how many individuals would fall under the bill's GPS monitoring requirements.

In summary, the bill requires notable initial and ongoing general revenue expenditures, particularly for DPS technology and staffing, but it is expected to improve victim safety and monitoring infrastructure across the state.

Vote Recommendation Notes

Despite the legitimate policy goal of protecting victims of family violence, HB 36 ultimately presents an overbroad and potentially harmful expansion of state authority that undermines key liberty principles. The bill's most significant concern lies in its requirement for magistrates to impose GPS monitoring based on broadly defined criteria without a mandate for individualized judicial findings. Once a person is determined to pose a "continuing threat," which can be triggered by prior protective order violations or even threats, monitoring becomes mandatory. This removes important judicial discretion and imposes government surveillance on individuals who have not yet been convicted of a crime, raising serious due process concerns.

From a fiscal perspective, the bill imposes a notable cost to taxpayers—$2.15 million over the first biennium alone, with recurring costs for staffing and technology maintenance. These expenses are required to implement new DPS-administered databases, notification systems, and staffing for victim assistance programs. While counties may receive grants to cover some local expenses, the expansion of monitoring systems, technology requirements, and data reporting obligations creates a lasting financial footprint with no meaningful constraints, review periods, or guarantees of measurable success in reducing violence.

HB 36 also increases the regulatory burden across multiple government layers. Judges and magistrates face new procedural mandates, law enforcement agencies must meet short reporting deadlines, and victims are pulled into complex systems of notification software with limited confidentiality protections. Meanwhile, individuals under court supervision are subject to expanded criminal liability for tampering with devices and must navigate unclear standards for cost-sharing, indigency determinations, and compliance.

While the bill does include waivers for indigent individuals and victim opt-in provisions, these safeguards are insufficient to overcome the fundamental problem: the bill codifies mandatory surveillance based on categorical risk, not individualized adjudication. This shift may unintentionally weaken due process protections, create unequal enforcement across jurisdictions, and entrench a costly bureaucratic apparatus without proven public safety returns.

In short, HB 36 advances an important cause—family violence prevention—but it does so through mechanisms that overextend the state’s surveillance power, burden taxpayers, and erode core principles of limited government and judicial discretion. For these reasons, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HB 36. Future efforts should focus on more targeted, voluntary, and evidence-based approaches that better balance safety with liberty.

  • Individual Liberty: This principle is most directly impacted, and negatively so, by the bill. The bill mandates pretrial GPS surveillance for individuals deemed to be a "continuing threat" without requiring individualized judicial findings beyond certain risk factors. This means a person not yet convicted could be subjected to continuous electronic tracking, including real-time location monitoring, as a condition of release. Such surveillance raises serious due process and Fourth Amendment concerns. It also sets a precedent for mandated, categorical surveillance policies, expanding government power over the bodily autonomy and freedom of movement of individuals who are still presumed innocent. Though the bill does include limited procedural safeguards, they fall short of ensuring proportionality or protecting the rights of the accused.
  • Personal Responsibility: The bill encourages offenders to take responsibility for their behavior through enhanced bond conditions and oversight. It also makes clear that tampering with a monitoring device is a punishable offense, reinforcing the concept that actions have consequences. However, personal responsibility is best fostered in systems that respect individual rights. When monitoring is mandatory and not linked to personal conduct during pretrial release (but instead to prior conduct), the moral link between action and consequence can become blurred, reducing the incentive for individuals to change behavior in exchange for leniency or restored trust.
  • Free Enterprise: The bill’s impact on the private market is minimal but worth noting. GPS monitoring devices and notification software are typically sourced through private vendors. By increasing demand for these technologies without establishing competitive safeguards, the bill may unintentionally favor specific government-approved providers, reducing the openness of the market. Additionally, when fees for monitoring are passed on to defendants and victims (even with indigency waivers), it creates government-driven demand for services that are not truly voluntary, further distorting the principles of free exchange and voluntary contract.
  • Private Property Rights: The bill prohibits offenders from tracking victims’ personal property or vehicles without consent, reinforcing the right of individuals to control access to their personal belongings. This provision is a welcome protection against the growing use of technology in abusive relationships and aligns with the foundational principle that property ownership includes the right to exclude others. However, the expansion of GPS mandates without voluntary consent for the wearer could raise future property-based privacy concerns if monitoring were extended to homes, workplaces, or shared devices.
  • Limited Government: The bill significantly expands the role of the state by mandating surveillance under certain criteria, creating a new state-run database and victim assistance program, requiring real-time law enforcement tracking and reporting infrastructure, and committing millions in new spending without sunset or review provisions. It also inserts mandatory conditions into judicial proceedings that traditionally involve discretion. These expansions move the state toward a more centralized and prescriptive criminal justice model, undermining the principle that government should be limited to only those actions necessary to protect life, liberty, and property.
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