According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), HB 4027 is not expected to have a significant fiscal impact on the state. The analysis concludes that any costs incurred as a result of implementing the bill’s provisions, such as increased judicial workload for evaluating depositions or motions to dismiss involving family violence allegations, could be absorbed by the affected agencies using existing resources. This indicates that the operational adjustments required by courts are not projected to rise to a level that necessitates additional funding or staffing.

From the perspective of local government, the fiscal note similarly indicates no significant impact is expected for county or municipal courts. Although the bill introduces additional procedural steps, such as disclosure of prior protective orders and evidentiary hearings to determine whether depositions or lawsuits are being used to harass, it appears that these duties fall within the current scope of judicial responsibilities and are not anticipated to generate new financial burdens on local jurisdictions.

The Office of Court Administration (OCA) and the Texas Judicial Council, which were consulted for this fiscal analysis, did not raise any cost concerns, reinforcing the assumption that the judiciary system can manage these changes with its existing infrastructure and personnel. Therefore, while the bill may lead to a modest increase in judicial oversight and documentation in certain civil cases, those changes are not expected to result in new appropriations or fiscal strain at either the state or local level.

HB 4027 is well-intentioned in its goal to prevent abusers from exploiting the legal system to further harass or intimidate victims of family violence or abusive conduct. However, while the policy objective is worthy, the bill’s mechanisms raise significant constitutional, procedural, and practical concerns that merit opposition unless amended. As currently written, HB 4027 alters longstanding procedural safeguards in civil law, expands judicial discretion in subjective ways, and infringes upon the Texas Supreme Court’s constitutional authority to oversee procedural rulemaking. Together, these issues outweigh the benefits of the bill in its present form.

First, the bill’s requirement that courts deny depositions or dismiss lawsuits upon finding, by “clear and convincing evidence,” that the purpose of a proceeding is to harass or control an alleged victim introduces a subjective and potentially inconsistent standard. Courts are being asked to assess motive, often before full discovery is conducted, based on allegations that may not yet be proven. This risks denying one party the right to pursue legitimate claims or defend themselves using standard procedural tools. Such an approach shifts the balance of due process and undermines the presumption of fairness that should guide all civil proceedings. Protecting victims is essential, but it cannot come at the expense of fundamental procedural rights that apply to every litigant, regardless of accusation.

Second, HB 4027 encroaches on the judiciary’s constitutionally delegated authority by explicitly prohibiting the Texas Supreme Court from modifying or repealing these provisions through rulemaking. This language undermines the principle of separation of powers by binding the courts to statutory procedures that they are otherwise empowered to manage independently. Historically, the Texas Legislature has avoided directly limiting the judiciary’s procedural authority in this way, understanding that courts are best equipped to develop, interpret, and refine procedural rules based on practical experience. Codifying inflexible procedural mandates risks creating confusion, inconsistency, and unnecessary litigation over jurisdictional boundaries.

Third, the bill opens the door to potential misuse by individuals who could falsely claim victim status to avoid depositions or have legitimate lawsuits dismissed. Just as “litigation abuse” can be a form of coercion, false or exaggerated allegations can weaponize protective mechanisms against those acting in good faith. Without more precise evidentiary safeguards, the bill could enable the very kind of abuse it seeks to prevent, only in reverse—allowing one party to obstruct justice and avoid accountability under the guise of victim protection.

Finally, HB 4027 adds procedural complexity and costs to an already overburdened court system, even if the Legislative Budget Board has found no major fiscal impact. Judges, attorneys, and court staff will have to navigate new evidentiary hearings and disclosure mandates, likely leading to more disputes and appeals about the interpretation of “harassment” or “control.” While these impacts may be absorbed within existing resources, they nonetheless complicate civil practice in ways that could slow resolution of legitimate claims.

For these reasons, HB 4027 should not advance in its current form. Amendments are needed to preserve due process, restore judicial rulemaking authority, clarify evidentiary procedures, and ensure that protective mechanisms cannot be exploited. Therefore, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HB 4027 unless amended as described above, supporting the underlying goal of protecting victims while opposing the procedural and constitutional flaws embedded in the bill’s current language.

• Individual Liberty: While the bill aims to protect the liberty of individuals who are victims of family violence by shielding them from coercive legal tactics like harassing depositions or lawsuits, it does so at the expense of the liberty of the accused. By empowering courts to deny discovery or dismiss cases based on a finding of intent (e.g., that the petitioner or plaintiff is acting to “harass, intimidate, or control”), it invites pre-adjudicative judgments without the protections of a full evidentiary process. This threatens the liberty of individuals to defend themselves, pursue legal redress, or engage in constitutionally protected civil processes. A core conservative understanding of liberty involves both protecting the vulnerable and guarding against unjust restrictions on lawful conduct, even for the accused.
• Personal Responsibility: The bill promotes personal responsibility by creating a mechanism to hold bad-faith litigants accountable for using the courts as tools of abuse. It rightly expects litigants to act in good faith and empowers courts to protect victims from those who weaponize legal proceedings. However, it also undermines personal responsibility by shifting important procedural decisions away from the normal rules of civil procedure and toward a preemptive, subjective evaluation of a party’s alleged intentions. This can insulate individuals from being held responsible for their actions, especially if a party falsely invokes victim status to avoid depositions or liability.
• Free Enterprise: While the bill is focused on personal and family-related civil litigation, the precedents it sets for civil discovery and motions to dismiss could bleed into broader civil litigation practice. If courts become more hesitant to allow depositions or more empowered to dismiss cases based on inferred intent rather than factual merits, it could disrupt contract enforcement or tort resolution in business-related disputes where allegations of coercion are raised. Although indirect, this potential to chill legitimate legal recourse could have downstream effects on the reliability of dispute resolution in a free enterprise system.
• Private Property Rights: The bill does not directly impact the use, enjoyment, or protection of private property. However, if a party cannot depose another or is denied a hearing in a property-related dispute (e.g., in domestic property divisions, trust disputes, or real estate litigation where family violence allegations are made), then it could affect a litigant’s ability to protect or recover their property. To the extent that the bill allows for early case dismissal based on intent rather than legal sufficiency, it could diminish procedural access to property claims for accused individuals.
• Limited Government: The bill undermines the principle of limited government in two key ways. First, it preempts the Texas Supreme Court’s constitutional authority to manage judicial procedure by explicitly barring rulemaking that would modify or repeal these provisions. This is a rare and significant legislative overreach into judicial governance. Second, it expands the judiciary’s power to make subjective determinations, like whether a legal action is intended to “harass”, early in a case, without the benefit of full evidence or cross-examination. These provisions create broader government control over civil litigation processes and reduce the predictability and neutrality that limited government demands.