According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), the fiscal implications of HB 46 are projected to be positive for the state, with the Legislative Budget Board estimating a net gain of approximately $5.75 million to General Revenue-related funds for the biennium ending August 31, 2027. This revenue gain primarily stems from the expansion of licensing within the Texas Compassionate-Use Program, including the issuance of up to 11 new licenses for cannabis dispensing organizations and associated registrant fees.
The Department of Public Safety (DPS) anticipates that it can implement the bill's provisions using existing resources, thus incurring no significant new expenses. However, it expects to collect considerable revenue starting in fiscal year 2026—approximately $5.37 million from original license fees, $80,916 in business application fees, and nearly $300,000 from original and renewal registration fees for individual registrants. Between 2028 and 2030, DPS projects collecting over $7 million in business renewal license fees and over $300,000 in additional registrant fees.
The Department of State Health Services (DSHS), which will be responsible for aspects of implementation such as oversight of registry access and rulemaking, also reports that it can absorb any additional costs using existing resources. Notably, the bill does not require an appropriation but establishes the framework to justify one if needed. Overall, HB 46 is expected to create a modest yet meaningful revenue stream for the state without significant fiscal burden, while supporting an expanded medical cannabis infrastructure.
HB 46, while framed as an expansion of the Texas Compassionate-Use Program (CUP), ultimately entrenches and extends the regulatory and bureaucratic structure that many critics of the program already find excessive. Though the bill purports to increase patient access by permitting satellite storage locations and modestly expanding eligible medical conditions, it does so by reinforcing centralized control mechanisms and introducing a host of new regulatory burdens that fundamentally contradict principles of limited government, personal liberty, and free enterprise.
First and foremost, the bill significantly grows the scope of government. It expands the authority of both the Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the Department of State Health Services (DSHS), granting them broad rulemaking power over licensing, registry access, site approval, and medical condition designations. These functions, particularly as they relate to healthcare decisions, move regulatory discretion even further from patients and physicians and into the hands of unelected agency bureaucrats. Instead of simplifying access or decentralizing decision-making, the bill further institutionalizes state control over who can participate in the program and under what circumstances.
Second, the legislation intensifies the licensing regime. It mandates the registration of all owners, directors, managers, and employees of dispensing organizations, requires criminal background checks for license transfers, and introduces new operational compliance mandates—including geographical restrictions on satellite sites and strict timeframes for activation. These requirements increase administrative overhead and compliance costs for cannabis businesses without evidence that they enhance public safety or patient welfare. They also raise barriers to market entry, concentrating control in the hands of existing licensees and larger operators better able to navigate complex regulatory frameworks.
Additionally, while the fiscal note indicates a modest positive impact to the state through increased licensing revenue, this financial benefit is not the result of economic growth or market expansion—it is derived from increased fees and compliance costs imposed on providers. The absence of taxpayer appropriations does not negate the broader economic cost of restricting participation, competition, and innovation within the market. The bill thus trades real opportunity for a narrow, state-controlled model that stifles entrepreneurial activity.
Most concerning is that HB 46 doubles down on a command-and-control model of healthcare access. Rather than empowering patients and their physicians with the freedom to explore potentially beneficial therapies, the bill maintains—and even expands—a state-run gatekeeping system. The CUP remains a tightly restricted program where a limited number of state-approved operators control access, and patients must navigate a state-sanctioned list of conditions, application criteria, and dispensing limitations. The bill reinforces this approach with little consideration for more patient-driven reforms or private-sector solutions.
For lawmakers committed to reducing regulatory burdens, dismantling monopolistic licensing structures, and shrinking the role of government in health and commerce, HB 46 represents a step in the wrong direction. While expanding medical freedom and access to care is a worthy goal, it cannot be accomplished through increased bureaucracy, expanded licensure, and top-down regulation. A truly reform-minded bill would streamline the program, reduce government interference, and open the door to broader provider and patient participation.
Accordingly, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HB 46.