89th Legislature

HB 5081

Overall Vote Recommendation
No
Principle Criteria
Free Enterprise
Property Rights
Personal Responsibility
Limited Government
Individual Liberty
Digest
HB 5081 creates new privacy protections for certain judicial personnel by adding Chapter 92 to the Texas Government Code. The bill designates “at-risk individuals” as judges, court clerks, and employees of the judicial branch, including staff of court clerks or other related agencies. It defines a category of “covered information,” including a broad range of personal data such as home addresses, personal phone numbers and emails, driver's license and Social Security numbers, vehicle license plates, employment and school information, and identifying details about family members, particularly minors.

Under the bill, individuals or the Office of Court Administration (OCA) acting on their behalf may submit written requests requiring entities—especially data brokers—not to disseminate or display covered information. Upon receiving such a request, the person or business must remove the data within 10 business days and ensure it is not reposted. The bill includes limited exceptions for journalistic activity, public records, legal compliance, law enforcement, and internal business uses.

HB 5081 creates civil liability for unauthorized disclosure, with injunctive relief, monetary penalties, and attorney's fees available to plaintiffs. Additionally, it creates a criminal offense for violations involving willful or harmful dissemination of covered data. The bill directs the judicial security division of the OCA to facilitate compliance by managing the request process on behalf of judges and overseeing enforcement procedures.

The legislation is aimed at enhancing security for judicial officers amid increasing threats and online targeting, though it also imposes new obligations and liabilities on data handlers, potentially raising concerns about the scope of regulated speech and access to public information.

The Senate Committee Substitute for HB 5081 differs from the House Engrossed version in several key areas, primarily expanding the scope and enforcement mechanisms of the bill. While both versions aim to protect personal information of “at-risk individuals” in the judiciary, the House version applies exclusively to data brokers, whereas the Senate version significantly broadens applicability to include any person or entity—not just data brokers—that disseminates covered information after receiving a written request not to do so. This expansion substantially increases the universe of potentially regulated actors under the Senate version.

Another important distinction lies in the enforcement timelines and responsibilities. The House version requires data brokers to act swiftly, mandating the removal of covered information within 72 hours and establishing criminal liability if removal does not occur within 48 hours. In contrast, the Senate version provides a more flexible, process-oriented framework, granting up to 10 business days for compliance after a written request is received. It also gives the Office of Court Administration (OCA) a more active role in coordinating and submitting removal requests on behalf of judges, suggesting a more centralized and administrative approach to enforcement.

The Senate version also revises the civil and criminal remedies framework. While both versions authorize fines and injunctive relief, the Senate’s broader applicability and inclusion of prima facie evidence provisions for intent to harm (based on non-compliance with removal requests) potentially make enforcement easier and more expansive. Additionally, the Senate version includes more exceptions for lawful dissemination, such as internal business use or public interest reporting, which are more narrowly drawn in the House version. Overall, the Senate substitute reflects a more measured, implementation-friendly bill, whereas the House version prioritizes speed and narrow targeting of data brokers.
Author
Jeff Leach
Sponsor
Brandon Creighton
Co-Sponsor
Judith Zaffirini
Fiscal Notes

According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), the fiscal implications of HB 5081 are currently indeterminate due to uncertainties surrounding the cost of implementing a system to manage removal requests of personal information for at-risk individuals. The bill requires the Office of Court Administration (OCA) to develop a mechanism through which judges and judicial employees can submit requests to have their personal information removed from publicly accessible Internet sources. While the policy intent is clear, the cost of developing and operating an adequate system to facilitate this process has not been fully established.

According to the Office of Court Administration, the estimated cost to implement such a system could range from $200,000 to $1,000,000. The variance depends on factors like the system’s complexity, technological features, automation level, and scalability to accommodate potentially high volumes of removal requests. Since the bill permits (but does not require) implementation only if the legislature appropriates funding, the actual fiscal impact will depend on whether such funds are allocated during the appropriations process.

Beyond the technology system, the bill is not expected to result in significant costs related to criminal justice enforcement. Although it creates new criminal offenses related to the posting or failure to remove protected information, the LBB anticipates no significant impact on correctional populations or demand for state correctional resources. Additionally, no significant fiscal implications are expected at the local government level.

Vote Recommendation Notes

HB 5081, while well-intentioned in its effort to safeguard the personal privacy of judicial officers, ultimately conflicts with multiple core liberty principles and raises substantial constitutional and policy concerns. The bill creates an expansive new regulatory regime targeting the dissemination of publicly accessible information, imposing both civil and criminal penalties on private individuals and entities that fail to remove or refrain from sharing covered data following a takedown request. Despite its narrow focus on “at-risk individuals” in the judicial branch, the scope of the bill’s restrictions and enforcement tools extends well beyond what is necessary to achieve that goal.

A key concern is the bill’s overreach into constitutionally protected expression and the public's right to access lawfully obtained information. HB 5081’s prohibition on the online display or transfer of “covered information” applies to a broad set of data categories, many of which are routinely found in public records or shared incidentally through lawful reporting. Although there are exceptions for speech on matters of public concern and voluntary disclosures, the chilling effect on news reporting, watchdog activity, and transparency initiatives cannot be ignored. The bill’s structure invites liability for conduct that may not be malicious, and it risks punishing those who act in good faith without notice of a takedown request.

Additionally, the regulatory and compliance burdens placed on businesses, particularly data brokers, online platforms, and small publishers, are significant. The requirement to remove content within a strict timeline, ensure it is not republished, and assist in identifying further instances of the information introduces costly new obligations. The bill also creates criminal offenses with vague intent requirements and civil penalties up to $500 per day, which could be weaponized through litigation. This runs counter to free enterprise principles and sets a troubling precedent of government-mediated censorship of lawful public data.

From a fiscal perspective, the bill’s implementation relies on the creation of a state-managed system to process removal requests. The Office of Court Administration estimates startup costs between $200,000 and $1 million, depending on the complexity of the system. These funds are not yet appropriated, meaning the policy may either be unfunded or require future legislative action to enable a potentially burdensome government program. For advocates of limited government, the bill's expansion of administrative infrastructure is difficult to reconcile with conservative budgeting principles.

In sum, while judicial safety is a legitimate concern, HB 5081’s methods undermine the very principles of free speech, limited government, and open civic discourse that our system depends on. The bill creates new statutory offenses, regulatory mandates, and information controls that exceed its narrow protective purpose. A more narrowly tailored solution, with stronger protections for speech and less regulatory drag, would be more appropriate. For these reasons, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HB 5081.

  • Individual Liberty: While the bill is framed as a protection of individual privacy for judges and judicial employees, it does so at the expense of broader liberty interests. It restricts the rights of individuals, including journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens, to share information that is publicly available or lawfully obtained. Even though there are exceptions for speech on matters of public concern, the bill opens the door to censorship through vague and expansive definitions of “covered information” and imposes criminal penalties for noncompliance. This risks chilling lawful speech and expression, infringing on First Amendment protections, and setting a dangerous precedent for restricting online content in other areas.
  • Personal Responsibility: The bill reduces the role of personal responsibility by shifting the burden of protection entirely onto third-party entities, namely data brokers and website operators. Instead of empowering at-risk individuals to use existing legal tools to protect their privacy (e.g., civil injunctions, harassment laws, or protective orders), the bill compels private actors to scrub the internet of designated information under threat of civil fines and criminal charges. This approach dilutes the principle that individuals are responsible for safeguarding their own security and instead centralizes responsibility in the state and regulated intermediaries.
  • Free Enterprise: The bill imposes costly and burdensome compliance obligations on private businesses, especially small firms operating in data analytics, real estate, digital publishing, or public records. It forces them to respond to takedown requests within rigid timeframes, scrub content across platforms they control, and manage enforcement with legal liability hanging over them. These mandates act as unfunded regulatory burdens on lawful businesses and create compliance uncertainty. The bill also introduces a form of compelled action on speech-related content, interfering with how businesses use data lawfully for services, reporting, or research. It introduces compliance costs and legal risks that are especially harmful to innovation and smaller market players.
  • Private Property Rights: The bill indirectly infringes on digital property rights by compelling individuals and businesses to delete or suppress content from websites and databases they lawfully own or operate. Though real property rights remain untouched, the principle of informational property is undermined when lawful possession and control of data must be ceded based on subjective requests, without a court order or clear due process. While the intent is protective, the mechanism, compelled removal, erodes the right to use and disseminate lawfully acquired data.
  • Limited Government: The bill substantially expands the reach of state government by creating new criminal offenses tied to information sharing, delegating regulatory enforcement powers to the Office of Court Administration (OCA), authorizing the creation of a statewide technology system to monitor and manage content removal requests, relying on civil penalties and private rights of action for enforcement, potentially leading to government-facilitated lawsuits against private actors. These expansions increase both the regulatory footprint of the state and the cost of governance. They also erode the principle that the government’s role should be limited to essential functions, rather than becoming an arbiter of what information can or cannot be shared online.
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