According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), the fiscal implications of HJR 218 are minimal for both the state and local governments, aside from the mandated costs of publishing the proposed constitutional amendment. Specifically, the only direct state expenditure anticipated is the cost of publishing the amendment in statewide newspapers ahead of the November 2025 election, which is estimated at $191,689.

Importantly, the resolution itself does not appropriate new funds or mandate any additional expenditures beyond what is already authorized under existing law. It simply expands the eligible uses of the Texas Energy Fund—already established for electric grid reliability—to include energy efficiency projects that benefit retail electric customers. As such, there is no immediate impact on state revenue or appropriations, and any future financial activity stemming from this change (such as loans or grants) would be managed within the existing framework and funding levels of the Public Utility Commission of Texas.

For local governments, the resolution also carries no significant fiscal implications. It neither imposes new mandates nor changes local revenue streams or regulatory responsibilities. The use of Energy Fund dollars would remain under the purview of the Public Utility Commission and would not alter the existing structure of local government operations or finance. Overall, while the policy implications may be broad, the fiscal impact as scored by the LBB is limited to one-time publication costs associated with placing the amendment on the ballot.

HJR 218 proposes a constitutional amendment to authorize the use of the Texas Energy Fund to finance energy efficiency projects conducted to benefit retail electric customers. While improving energy efficiency is a worthwhile objective in theory, this measure raises substantive concerns across multiple liberty-aligned principles and reflects a broader pattern of constitutional and fiscal overreach that justifies a firm “No” recommendation.

First, the resolution significantly expands the government’s role in the energy sector. The Texas Energy Fund was originally established to support electric generating capacity and associated infrastructure to enhance grid reliability—a core public interest function. By contrast, the proposed amendment shifts part of this mission toward demand-side projects like energy efficiency upgrades for individual customers. This alters the fund’s purpose from ensuring systemwide reliability to subsidizing individual or private sector consumption behavior—an activity that should be left to the marketplace. Expanding the scope of state involvement in energy finance risks politicizing energy priorities and interfering with market competition.

Second, the resolution explicitly allows for the issuance of grants. Unlike loans, which maintain a clear expectation of repayment and financial accountability, grants introduce a non-repayable form of public subsidy. Grant programs are inherently redistributive and prone to mission creep, particularly when there are few statutory limits or oversight mechanisms baked into the authorizing language. Allowing the state to issue grants for energy efficiency projects opens the door to inefficiencies, favoritism, or the subsidization of projects that could or should be financed by private capital.

Third, this proposal enshrines a programmatic funding policy into the Texas Constitution, continuing a trend of using constitutional amendments as vehicles for operational initiatives. The Constitution is intended to be a durable framework that outlines government structure, not a repository for evolving policy preferences. Making this type of spending authorization constitutional severely limits the ability of future legislatures to adjust or repeal it as conditions change. It also places the state on a trajectory of codifying spending authority in a manner that undermines legislative flexibility and accountability.

Fourth, while the fiscal note suggests no significant cost beyond the $191,689 required for ballot publication, the structural implications are more significant. Authorizing a new category of spending from an existing fund—even without additional appropriations—inevitably dilutes the focus and financial discipline of that fund. The Texas Energy Fund was created to bolster the resiliency of the grid, particularly in the aftermath of Winter Storm Uri. Redirecting those dollars toward energy efficiency projects shifts finite resources away from that original and urgent purpose, potentially weakening the state's reliability posture.

In sum, HJR 218 represents an expansion of state authority, a misuse of constitutional mechanisms, and a deviation from the fund’s intended use—all of which compromise key principles of limited government, fiscal responsibility, and free market integrity. For those reasons, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HJR 218.

• Individual Liberty: The resolution could provide indirect benefits to individuals by encouraging more efficient energy use, potentially lowering electricity bills and enhancing access to modern energy technologies. However, the mechanism—state-managed loans and grants—means individual freedom is not being expanded by personal choice or market access, but rather by state-administered programs. Because participation in these programs is voluntary, it doesn’t directly restrict liberty, but embedding such programs in the constitution raises concerns about permanent state involvement in areas better left to private initiative.
• Personal Responsibility: By authorizing grants, HJR 218 reduces the incentive for individuals and businesses to bear the costs of their own energy decisions. Energy efficiency upgrades can often pay for themselves over time through savings. When the state steps in to subsidize these efforts, it removes the cost-benefit calculation that would normally lead a consumer to act responsibly. This undermines the principle that individuals should take ownership of their energy usage and infrastructure investments without relying on public funding.
• Free Enterprise: The bill distorts market dynamics by introducing government-backed funding—particularly non-repayable grants—into an area that private energy service companies already serve competitively. This creates a risk of crowding out private capital and picking winners and losers based on bureaucratic criteria rather than market performance. It may discourage private companies from innovating or investing in efficiency upgrades if they must compete with state-subsidized alternatives. This is a direct infringement on free enterprise, where market forces—not government funding—should determine outcomes.
• Private Property Rights: HJR 218 does not explicitly infringe on property rights. It neither authorizes eminent domain nor compels private landowners to take specific actions. However, it may create soft pressure or programmatic incentives that push utilities or consumers toward certain upgrades or retrofits, which could eventually evolve into de facto regulatory expectations. That said, under the resolution as written, participation remains voluntary, so the immediate impact on property rights is minimal.
• Limited Government: The most troubling aspect of the resolution is its constitutional expansion of government authority. It takes an existing fund created for a narrow, well-defined purpose (electric generation and grid reliability) and broadens its scope to include energy efficiency projects for retail customers. This is not a statutory change—it is a permanent constitutional change, which reduces future legislative flexibility and increases the risk of mission creep. Embedding this authority into the Constitution permanently expands the size, scope, and reach of government into private-sector energy decisions. Additionally, it does so through a mechanism (grants) that increases the state’s financial footprint without sufficient built-in limits.

• HB 5623 (Enabled by)