89th Legislature Regular Session

SB 2532

Overall Vote Recommendation
Yes
Principle Criteria
Free Enterprise
Property Rights
Personal Responsibility
Limited Government
Individual Liberty
Digest
SB 2532 seeks to amend Sections 26.012, 26.04, and 26.041 of the Texas Tax Code to revise how the voter-approval tax rate is calculated for a specific class of coastal municipalities. The bill introduces a new financial penalty mechanism targeting municipalities that misuse hotel occupancy tax revenue or receive and improperly spend funds from their local park boards of trustees. These municipalities are defined as “eligible coastal municipalities,” specifically those that qualify under Section 351.001(3)(A) and have established a park board under Section 306.011 of the Local Government Code.

The key innovation of SB 2532 is the creation of the “misspent public money” concept. This term refers to any hotel tax revenue spent for purposes not authorized by Chapter 351 of the Tax Code, as well as any other money transferred from a municipality’s park board and used inappropriately. A new calculation—called the “misspent public money rate”—is added to the tax rate formula. This rate is subtracted from the municipality’s voter-approval tax rate, effectively reducing the amount of revenue the city can raise without triggering a public vote.

The bill makes conforming changes to tax rate formulas in scenarios where cities collect additional sales taxes. For eligible coastal municipalities, the voter-approval tax rate becomes:

(No-new-revenue M&O rate × 1.035) + (Debt rate + Unused increment rate − Misspent public money rate)

The legislative intent appears to be twofold: to enforce accountability over dedicated tax revenues such as hotel occupancy taxes and to discourage municipalities from inappropriately reallocating funds received from park boards. If passed, this measure would introduce a financial consequence, via lowered taxing authority, for misuse of specific public revenues, thereby reinforcing lawful fiscal stewardship in tourism-related coastal cities.

The Committee Substitute for SB 2532 significantly broadens and refines the original bill's approach to fiscal oversight of coastal municipalities that receive hotel occupancy tax revenue. The original version narrowly focused on penalizing municipalities that failed to transfer those funds to their park boards and instead used them directly for any purpose. It defined “misspent hotel occupancy tax revenue” as revenue that was not routed through the park board, regardless of how it was ultimately used. This structure effectively enforced a rigid administrative requirement rather than focusing on whether the spending itself was appropriate under the law.

In contrast, the Committee Substitute adopts a more substantive accountability framework by redefining the term as “misspent public money.” This expanded definition includes both misused Chapter 351 hotel tax funds and any additional monies received from the park board that were used for unauthorized purposes. By doing so, the bill shifts from enforcing a procedural rule—simply requiring transfer of funds—to evaluating whether the expenditures themselves violated statutory purposes. This reflects a stronger focus on the outcomes of public fund use rather than the internal municipal process.

Additionally, the Committee Substitute makes technical improvements to the tax rate calculation formula, integrating the new “misspent public money rate” more precisely alongside existing variables such as the unused increment rate and sales tax gain or loss rate. These changes improve statutory clarity and ensure smoother implementation by local taxing authorities. Overall, the Committee Substitute transitions the bill from a narrow administrative compliance tool to a broader fiscal accountability mechanism aimed at deterring misuse of taxpayer funds and promoting lawful public spending.
Author
Mayes Middleton
Fiscal Notes

According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), the fiscal implications of SB 2532 are expected to be neutral for the state but potentially impactful at the local level. According to the Legislative Budget Board, there is no anticipated fiscal effect on the State of Texas. This is because the bill does not modify state revenue sources or expenditures, nor does it impose any direct mandates that would require state-level appropriations or administrative adjustments.

However, for eligible coastal municipalities—those with fewer than 80,000 residents, bordering the Gulf of Mexico, and governed by a park board of trustees—the bill could result in a reduction in their voter-approval tax rate. This reduction would occur if the municipality is found to have misused hotel occupancy tax revenue or spent money received from its park board in a manner not authorized under Chapter 351 of the Tax Code. In such cases, the “misspent public money rate” is subtracted from the standard voter-approval tax rate, potentially limiting the municipality’s ability to raise property tax revenue without voter approval.

The local fiscal impact, therefore, hinges on compliance. Municipalities that strictly adhere to authorized uses of hotel tax revenue and park board funding would see no effect. However, noncompliant municipalities may face constraints on future revenue generation, which could affect budgeting flexibility, service delivery, or the need to seek voter approval for higher rates. The bill acts as a financial disincentive for misuse of dedicated public funds, potentially encouraging tighter local financial oversight and more conservative fiscal planning.

Vote Recommendation Notes

Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote YES on SB 2532 based on its clear objective: enhancing fiscal accountability in how certain coastal municipalities handle hotel occupancy tax (HOT) revenue and funds received from park boards. The bill imposes no new taxes, no new regulations on private individuals or businesses, and does not grow the size or scope of government. Instead, it introduces a targeted consequence: if a city misuses tourism-related funds, it will lose part of its ability to raise property taxes without voter approval. This ties municipal taxing authority directly to compliance with spending laws and reinforces legislative intent around HOT revenue.

From a liberty-focused perspective, SB 2532 upholds the principles of limited government and personal responsibility by penalizing municipalities for using earmarked funds improperly. It serves as a financial check on local governments that attempt to divert visitor-generated tax revenue for general operating expenses, circumventing park boards and undermining public trust. The bill’s mechanism strengthens local oversight without creating new enforcement agencies or state mandates, and its fiscal effect is limited to localities that violate existing law—meaning it rewards compliant municipalities and penalizes only those that mismanage funds.

Importantly, while the bill earns support for promoting transparency and accountability, it does not address the broader policy concern regarding the hotel occupancy tax itself. HOT is often criticized for being a distortionary, carve-out tax that targets a specific industry and group (tourists) who cannot vote in the jurisdictions where the tax is imposed. It funds programs and promotional efforts that could arguably be better managed by private enterprise. In many cases, HOT revenue becomes a slush fund for local pet projects, justified under the vague umbrella of "tourism promotion." These concerns remain valid, and SB 2532—though it may improve stewardship of HOT dollars—does not resolve the more fundamental issue of whether the tax should exist in its current form at all.

Therefore, this recommendation supports the bill as a corrective measure that improves the integrity of existing law. At the same time, it encourages future legislative examination of the structure and necessity of the hotel occupancy tax itself, with the goal of reducing reliance on such targeted and often-misused revenue streams.

  • Individual Liberty: The bill does not directly affect individual rights or freedoms. It neither restricts nor expands civil liberties, nor does it regulate private conduct. Its scope is strictly governmental, affecting only how certain municipalities manage and account for specific public funds. As such, it has no meaningful positive or negative impact on individual liberty.
  • Personal Responsibility: The bill reinforces the principle that governments should be accountable for their actions, just as individuals are. By penalizing municipalities that misuse dedicated hotel occupancy tax revenue or improperly spend money transferred from their park boards, the bill enforces a clear consequence for poor fiscal stewardship. This promotes responsible budgeting and compliance with state law, holding public officials to the same standard expected of taxpayers and business owners.
  • Free Enterprise: While the bill does not directly impact private business or market regulation, it contributes to a more honest and efficient public spending environment, especially in tourism-dependent economies. When local governments misuse HOT funds—originally intended to promote tourism—it can distort market incentives or unfairly advantage government-run projects over private ones. By keeping these funds confined to their legal purpose, the bill helps preserve a clearer boundary between public and private roles in economic development, which aligns modestly with free enterprise principles.
  • Private Property Rights: The bill indirectly supports property rights by helping prevent the misuse of public funds that could otherwise lead to excessive or unjustified property tax increases. By reducing a municipality’s authority to raise taxes without voter approval if they mismanage HOT funds, the bill acts as a protective measure for taxpayers, guarding against backdoor revenue expansion that could burden property owners. It ensures that any increases in the tax burden must pass voter scrutiny when fiscal mismanagement is present.
  • Limited Government: The bill exemplifies limited government in practice: it restricts local government behavior, enforces existing law more effectively, and does so without growing state bureaucracy or creating new programs. Instead of increasing government power, it curtails local authority where abuse occurs, reinforcing legislative intent and the proper boundaries of public finance. The bill introduces no new taxes, regulations, or state-level enforcement regimes—only a self-executing formula-based constraint that aligns government taxing power with legal compliance.
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