According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), there is no significant fiscal impact anticipated to the State of Texas from implementing this constitutional amendment. The core procedural change—allowing the Legislature to reconvene for one day to override gubernatorial vetoes—does not introduce ongoing operational costs or require new infrastructure, personnel, or programming.

The primary expense associated with the resolution is the cost of publication, which is required for placing the proposed constitutional amendment on the statewide ballot. This is a standard expense for all proposed amendments and is estimated at $191,689. The report further notes that this cost could be absorbed within existing state resources, suggesting that no additional appropriations would be needed to fulfill this requirement.

At the local level, the resolution is not expected to create any significant fiscal implications for cities, counties, or other units of local government. Since the proposed amendment pertains strictly to the internal procedures of the state Legislature and does not mandate new responsibilities or costs for local entities, it avoids imposing unfunded mandates or operational burdens. In short, while the resolution has a nominal publication cost, it is fiscally neutral in practice and poses no measurable financial risk to either state or local government budgets.

SJR 39 proposes a constitutional amendment that restores an essential balance between the legislative and executive branches of the Texas government. Currently, the governor can effectively nullify legislation passed with strong bipartisan support by vetoing it after the Legislature has adjourned sine die, leaving lawmakers without a practical recourse until the next session—often nearly two years later. SJR 39 corrects this imbalance by allowing the Legislature to reconvene for a single day on the 22nd day after adjournment to reconsider bills or appropriation items vetoed in the final ten days of session that had passed with significant support.

The bill analysis underscores the rationale for this change: It provides a mechanism for the Legislature to act on behalf of the people of Texas when a bill, passed by a two-thirds majority in at least one chamber, is struck down by executive veto at a time when legislators are constitutionally barred from reconvening. The resolution enables the Legislature to fulfill its role as the voice of the people without the delays and procedural hurdles of awaiting the next regular session or relying on the governor to call a special session.

This proposal is narrowly tailored to ensure that the override authority is used only under specific conditions and for legislation with demonstrable broad support. The override session is limited to a single day, and only vetoed items that meet stringent criteria can be reconsidered. Moreover, the resolution has no significant fiscal impact beyond a standard publication cost for placing the amendment on the ballot. By enhancing transparency, respecting constitutional checks and balances, and allowing for the timely correction of vetoes inconsistent with legislative consensus, SJR 39 advances the principles of democratic accountability and limited government.

For these reasons, and considering its alignment with liberty-based principles such as separation of powers and responsiveness to the electorate, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote YES on SJR 39.

• Individual Liberty: The resolution empowers duly elected representatives to act on behalf of their constituents even after the regular legislative session ends. By providing a mechanism to override vetoes of broadly supported bills—those passed by at least a two-thirds vote in one chamber—the resolution ensures that individual voices, expressed through their legislators, are not silenced by procedural technicalities or unilateral executive decisions. It protects the public’s right to have their legislative priorities enacted, especially when they reflect broad consensus.
• Personal Responsibility: The bill does not impose new personal obligations or shift responsibility from the individual to the state. However, it may indirectly enhance the sense of accountability among legislators by granting them a final opportunity to act on vetoed legislation they originally supported. It holds public officials responsible for following through on their constituents’ will.
• Free Enterprise: The resolution enhances legislative authority but introduces a neutral procedural tool that could be used to either restore market-friendly reforms or reinstate interventionist policies that undermine economic liberty. The principle at play here is really democratic accountability, not economic ideology. Therefore, while it strengthens the Legislature's hand, it doesn’t necessarily advance or inhibit free enterprise—that outcome depends on the policy content of the overridden bill.
• Private Property Rights: The resolution reinforces the Legislature’s procedural power to respond to vetoes, but it does not guarantee that the outcomes will protect or enhance property rights. It opens the door to both the restoration of protective legislation and the revival of potentially harmful measures that could erode landowner freedoms. As such, its alignment with private property rights depends entirely on the specific content of the legislation being reconsidered.
• Limited Government: The resolution is a clear affirmation of limited government. While it expands legislative power in a specific context, it does so within narrow and constitutionally bound parameters: only for bills passed with high levels of support, only after session adjournment, and only for one day. It reestablishes a key check on executive power without granting the Legislature broad or open-ended authority. In doing so, it rebalances power among branches of government without expanding overall government reach.