Good Intentions, Bad Incentives

Estimated Time to Read: 3 minutes

Public policy debates often begin in a familiar place: compassion, fairness, safety, and stability. Laws are proposed to help, programs are designed to protect, and regulations are crafted to improve outcomes. The intentions are sincere, and the rhetoric is reassuring, but the results are often disappointing.

Good policy requires looking beyond immediate and emotional effects to consider longer-term and unseen consequences. Public policy should be judged by its results, not its intentions. Good intentions are common; good outcomes occur far less often than promised. The difference lies in incentives.

When policymakers design programs, they rarely ask the most important question:

How will people actually behave under these rules?

Consider how easily incentives drift away from stated goals:

  • A program created to reduce costs may reward spending.
  • A regulation meant to improve quality may encourage box-checking.
  • A subsidy intended to stabilize markets may distort them.
  • An agency formed to solve a problem may develop a vested interest in the problem’s persistence.

This is not necessarily corruption. It is often a structural oversight. The hard truth is that even well-meaning interventions reshape behavior in ways planners cannot fully anticipate.

Funding formulas designed to equalize outcomes often reward inputs rather than performance. Economic incentives intended to attract investment sometimes socialize risk while privatizing gain. Regulatory frameworks built to ensure compliance frequently evolve into procedural mazes where avoiding liability becomes more important than delivering value.

In most cases, the political architects are guided by reasonable and laudable goals. However, the participants, whether individuals, firms, or agencies, adapt to the incentives embedded in the system. When this happens, the policy takes on a life of its own, and its original purpose becomes secondary:

  • Organizations protect budgets.
  • Bureaucracies avoid risk.
  • Recipients respond to benefits.
  • Regulated parties respond to rules.

Over time, behavior aligns not with legislative intent, but with institutional reward.

One of the clearest examples in Texas can be seen in school finance and attendance incentives. The entirely reasonable goal of encouraging student presence in the classroom produced a funding model tied largely to Average Daily Attendance (ADA). While the intention was sound, the incentives were decisive. District priorities naturally shifted toward protecting attendance counts.

Creating and expanding policy is easy; correcting policy is difficult. Failures rarely lead to  structural reconsideration. Instead, they invite adjustments, amendments, and refinements that often add new layers without addressing the underlying incentives that produced the failure in the first place.

A free society depends not merely on good laws, but on realistic ones grounded in an honest understanding of human behavior.

Good intentions may justify action, but only sound incentives justify confidence that a policy is appropriate. In public policy, as in economics, outcomes are governed less by what we hope will happen than by what people are rewarded for doing.

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