Estimated Time to Read: 6 minutes
Within the last week, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton (R) filed four major lawsuits targeting companies allegedly tied to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The cases involve TP-Link routers, Anzu Robotics drones, Lorex home security cameras, and the Temu shopping app.
Viewed in isolation, each lawsuit appears to be a discrete consumer protection action. Taken together, they represent something more deliberate. Texas is building a coordinated enforcement strategy aimed at CCP-linked economic and technological influence inside the state.
Over the past several years, Texas has moved to divest state investments from China, investigated CCP-linked activity in energy infrastructure, confronted harassment operations connected to Beijing, expanded the state’s Prohibited Technologies List, and passed Senate Bill 17 restricting certain foreign land purchases. The lawsuits now extend that effort into consumer technology and digital infrastructure.
This is not about geopolitics in the abstract. It is about sovereignty in practice, and sovereignty begins with transparency.
TP-Link: Routers, Supply Chains, and Informed Consent
The petition against TP-Link alleges that the company marketed routers as “Made in Vietnam” while sourcing nearly all components from China and maintaining substantial Chinese operations. The legal question is not whether final assembly occurred in Vietnam. It is whether the marketing created the impression of insulation from Chinese state influence when the supply chain and operational structure remained materially tied to China.
The petition describes TP-Link devices as “modern weapons of war, enabling a foreign adversary to surveil and attack the United States”. That language is intentionally forceful. Routers sit at the center of a home’s digital ecosystem. They route financial transactions, business communications, health records, and private data. If those devices are manufactured by companies operating under a legal regime that mandates intelligence cooperation, that exposure is not trivial.
The lawsuit also challenges TP-Link’s marketing of router security features, citing documented firmware vulnerabilities and alleged exploitation by Chinese state-linked actors. The State argues that the devices “are not the secure American devices that Texas consumers have consented to purchase”.
The key liberty principle here is informed consent. Free enterprise functions only when consumers are given accurate information about material risks. If exposure to the Chinese National Intelligence Law is a realistic possibility, the State argues that Texans had a right to know before purchasing a device that controls access to their private networks.
This lawsuit reframes supply chain transparency as a consumer protection obligation rather than merely a trade policy issue.
Anzu Robotics: Rebranding and the Limits of Corporate Separation
The lawsuit against Anzu Robotics alleges that its Raptor T drone was effectively a DJI Mavic 3 “painted green”. According to the petition, the hardware, firmware, and software architecture were substantially identical. The State characterizes the drone as “nothing more than a 21st-century Trojan horse linked to the CCP”.
This case centers on whether corporate restructuring and rebranding can sever national security exposure when technical control remains elsewhere. The petition alleges that DJI retained cryptographic signing keys capable of decrypting firmware. If encryption authority remains with the original manufacturer, then claims of independence are weakened.
The State also challenges representations that Anzu products were insulated from foreign data exposure. The argument is not that foreign technology must be banned categorically. It is that claims of independence must match technical reality.
Limited government requires precision in enforcement, but it also requires integrity in the marketplace. If a company markets itself as a secure American alternative while maintaining critical dependencies tied to restricted entities, the State contends that representation may be materially misleading.
The broader implication is that corporate form alone cannot erase functional control.
Lorex: Security Cameras and the Meaning of Private Property
The Lorex lawsuit shifts the focus to the home. The petition alleges that Lorex marketed cameras under the slogan “protect what matters most” while failing to disclose that components were supplied by Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co., Ltd., a company designated as a Chinese Military Company.
The petition accuses Lorex of “ruthlessly exploit[ing]” parental instinct. Parents purchase cameras for safety, especially in nurseries and children’s bedrooms. If those devices contain components tied to entities operating under Chinese intelligence law, that fact may be material to a purchasing decision.
Private property rights do not end at the front door. They extend to the digital data generated inside the home. If footage, metadata, or network traffic is exposed to a regime that mandates intelligence cooperation, the consumer has a right to know.
The lawsuit also references documented Dahua vulnerabilities and the potential legal exposure created by China’s intelligence framework. Again, the State’s case does not hinge on proving that footage was accessed. It hinges on whether the omission of supply chain and legal exposure was deceptive.
The case reinforces a foundational liberty principle. Ownership includes control. Control requires knowledge.
Temu: Data Harvesting, Digital Manipulation, and Sovereignty
The lawsuit against PDD Holdings and Whaleco Inc., operating as Temu, expands the enforcement effort into mobile applications and data harvesting. The petition states directly that “Temu is actually spyware disguised as a shopping app”.
The State alleges intrusive permissions, excessive data collection, and deceptive promotional practices. It also asserts that Temu failed to disclose that, under Chinese law, consumer data may be accessible to PRC authorities. This case highlights a modern extension of property rights. Personal data is property in functional terms. It reflects identity, behavior, and financial activity. If a company collects and monetizes that data while concealing foreign exposure risks, the consumer’s autonomy is diminished.
Temu’s scale amplifies the concern. Tens of millions of Americans use the app. If data flows through corporate structures subject to CCP authority, the exposure is systemic. This lawsuit situates digital surveillance within the broader sovereignty debate. Texas has already addressed the foreign acquisition of land. It is now confronting foreign access to data.
The SB 17 Connection: From Land to Digital Territory
During the 89th Legislative Session, lawmakers passed Senate Bill 17 (SB 17), authored by State Sen. Lois Kolkhorst (R-Brenham), restricting certain foreign governmental entities, companies, and individuals tied to designated countries from purchasing real property in Texas. The bill’s findings reference national security concerns and cite the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment, which identifies China’s aggressive whole-of-government approach to surpassing the United States.
SB 17 reflects legislative recognition that economic transactions can serve as vehicles for geopolitical leverage. The statute created enforcement authority for the Attorney General, including civil penalties, divestiture requirements, and criminal consequences for intentional violations.
The current lawsuits extend that logic into digital infrastructure. If foreign adversary influence in physical land ownership presents a security risk, then concealed exposure within digital infrastructure may present a comparable one.
The philosophical foundation is consistent. Sovereignty requires vigilance across both physical and digital domains.
Political and Policy Implications
These lawsuits are likely to influence the next legislative session in 2027. They reinforce the legitimacy of prior executive actions and statutory reforms. They may also catalyze new proposals requiring disclosure of foreign adversary supply chain exposure in consumer products.
At the same time, a careful balance must be maintained. Confronting CCP-linked influence should not devolve into indiscriminate economic nationalism. Texas’s strength lies in free enterprise, open markets, and the predictable rule of law. Enforcement should remain grounded in deception, not origin alone.
The consistent thread across these cases is transparency. If companies wish to operate in Texas, they must disclose material facts about corporate control, legal jurisdiction, and data exposure. That is not protectionism. It is principled governance.
Sovereignty Requires Truth
From routers described as “modern weapons of war” to drones labeled a “Trojan horse”, to cameras allegedly exploiting parental trust, to an app characterized as “spyware disguised as a shopping app”, the escalation is unmistakable.
Texas is not simply reacting. It is building a framework. Free enterprise depends on honest disclosure. Private property includes control over digital data. Individual liberty requires informed consent. Limited government requires targeted, lawful enforcement rather than panic-driven overreach.
Whether these lawsuits ultimately prevail in court remains to be seen. But the trajectory is clear.
Texas has decided that sovereignty in the twenty-first century includes the integrity of supply chains, digital infrastructure, and the data inside its citizens’ homes. And that debate is only beginning.
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