According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), the fiscal implications of HB 2 remain indeterminate due to several cost variables that are currently unknown. While the bill authorizes revenue generation through licensing and background check fees, and allows for the acceptance of gifts, grants, and donations, the number of participants and the actual amounts that will be collected are presently unquantifiable. Therefore, the overall revenue impact on the state cannot yet be calculated.

The Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM) anticipates $808,333 in costs for FY 2026 and $191,667 in FY 2027 to support the establishment of a new statewide volunteer registration system, additional training initiatives for justices of the peace, and initial implementation of the emergency manager licensing framework. These estimates do not include future expenses related to background checks, which the agency would conduct as part of the licensing and volunteer vetting process.

The Department of State Health Services (DSHS) estimates the need for one additional full-time employee to develop a communications plan related to mass fatality events, with related costs totaling $130,718 in FY 2026 and $165,468 in FY 2027. DSHS already oversees the Texas Mass Fatality Operations Response Team (TMORT), which may absorb some responsibilities under the bill. However, the department would need to create a new data system to fulfill provisions requiring real-time updates for family members of mass fatality victims, since the existing Pulsara system is not equipped for this function. The cost of developing this new system is currently unknown.

Finally, while no significant fiscal impact is expected for local governments, the bill's implementation costs for state agencies such as the Texas Commission on Fire Protection and the Department of Public Safety are expected to be absorbed within existing budgets.

HB 2 proposes a significant reorganization of Texas’s disaster preparedness and emergency response infrastructure in light of operational failures observed during the 2025 Central Texas floods. While the bill's overarching intent, to strengthen the state’s capacity to manage mass casualty incidents, train local officials, and coordinate volunteers, is well-grounded in real-world challenges, the mechanisms it employs raise serious and unresolved concerns regarding multiple Liberty Principles. As currently written, HB 2 is incompatible with those principles, though it could become acceptable if substantially amended in targeted ways.

At the heart of HB 2 is the creation of a mandatory, state-administered licensing regime for local emergency management coordinators. This system, administered by the Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP) in partnership with the Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM), imposes minimum training requirements, criminal history background checks, continuing education, and annual license renewal. While the bill allows some flexibility through recognition of military or out-of-state experience, the licensing mandate represents a significant shift in how local emergency personnel are selected and trained. It overrides local discretion, imposes a one-size-fits-all credentialing framework, and risks excluding qualified individuals based on centralized criteria. This structure fundamentally limits local control and contradicts the principle of decentralized governance, placing it in direct conflict with Liberty Principles centered on Limited Government and Individual Liberty.

The bill also mandates the creation of a centralized volunteer registration and credentialing system. While some level of screening is justifiable in high-security or sensitive disaster response roles, HB 2 requires that even unaffiliated, spontaneous volunteers register with the state, undergo background checks, and potentially face disqualification under rules yet to be defined. This bureaucratic gatekeeping mechanism introduces a high barrier to participation in community response and recovery efforts and may deter well-meaning individuals from offering assistance in times of crisis. By shifting volunteerism from a rights-based civic contribution to a regulated, permission-based process, the bill undermines traditional mutual aid and local initiative, again infringing on Individual Liberty and Personal Responsibility.

Additionally, HB 2 introduces new compliance mandates for local governments, such as expanded emergency training for sheriffs and mayors, and coordination requirements for justices of the peace, without guaranteeing that funding or administrative resources will accompany them. While TDEM is authorized to collect fees and accept grants, the actual availability of offsetting revenue is unknown. This raises concerns about unfunded mandates, particularly for small jurisdictions with limited administrative capacity, and violates the principle of Limited Government in its fiscal dimension. The bill also imposes licensing fees and training burdens on local public servants without offering meaningful local opt-outs or scalable implementation options.

Although HB 2 upholds Private Property Rights by affirming that property owners retain discretion over whether to accept volunteer assistance, this protection does not extend to broader private sector concerns. For example, while HB 2 does not include the specific private campground mandates seen in Senate Bill 2, it still contributes to the centralization of disaster-related decision-making. It expands state surveillance over private individuals through broad criminal history access and creates administrative systems that may persist indefinitely, as the bill includes no sunset provisions or mechanisms for legislative review of new regulatory programs.

Finally, the bill’s fiscal implications are open-ended. The Legislative Budget Board (LBB) notes that while cost recovery mechanisms are authorized (such as licensing and background check fees), the actual costs of implementing the mass fatality data system, the volunteer registry, and the licensing infrastructure cannot be precisely estimated. Without cost caps, clear appropriation limits, or assurance that these systems will scale efficiently, HB 2 risks creating a long-term administrative and fiscal burden that grows beyond the bill's original scope.

In summary, HB 2 aims to address real and urgent issues in Texas’s disaster management system, but it does so in a manner that is overly centralized, regulatory in nature, and dismissive of local governance autonomy and individual civic freedom. As such, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HB 2 unless amended as described below. Substantial and specific amendments would be necessary to reconcile the bill with Liberty Principles, such as limiting mandatory licensure to high-risk or urban jurisdictions, exempting spontaneous volunteers from registration, establishing sunset provisions for new state systems, and ensuring local opt-in authority for participation in state-run frameworks. Without such changes, the bill should not advance in its current form.

• Individual Liberty: The bill significantly affects individual liberty through the imposition of state control over who may serve as emergency management coordinators and who may volunteer in disaster response efforts. The bill requires all emergency management coordinators to obtain a state-issued license (with minimum training, background checks, and renewals) and all spontaneous volunteers to register in a centralized system and undergo criminal background checks prior to deployment. These provisions transform what were once community-driven and locally accountable roles into positions subject to state oversight and permission, effectively conditioning participation in local disaster response on government approval. This approach diminishes the ability of individuals to serve their communities freely and undermines the historical role of civil society and mutual aid in disaster recovery.
• Personal Responsibility: The bill promotes personal responsibility in some areas, particularly by requiring training for local officials, including justices of the peace, mayors, and sheriffs, to ensure competent and timely disaster response, requiring ongoing continuing education for emergency management personnel, and mandating annual disaster drills and after-action reports to institutionalize learning and preparedness. However, this positive intent is undermined by the top-down, compulsory nature of the mandates. Instead of fostering a culture of local accountability and initiative, the bill substitutes it with a centralized, rules-based model that may deter locally led improvements or adaptation. The result is less a cultivation of responsibility and more a compliance regime.
• Free Enterprise: While the bill does not directly regulate businesses as aggressively as its Senate counterpart (SB 2), it still impacts the principle of free enterprise in meaningful ways. The new licensing requirements and background check fees may raise barriers for individuals and contractors seeking to work in emergency management, including those affiliated with the private sector or nonprofit disaster relief. Expanding the state’s control over credentialing it creates entry costs and bureaucratic red tape that could disadvantage small, rural, or independent actors who lack the administrative infrastructure to navigate state requirements. The bill also empowers agencies like the Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP) to set undefined standards and fees, increasing regulatory uncertainty for those engaged in disaster preparedness as a profession or service.
• Private Property Rights: One area where the bill respects Liberty Principles is in its protection of private property rights. The bill clearly affirms that property owners are not obligated to allow volunteers onto their land. Consent is required before volunteers, state-credentialed or not, may access private property. This language ensures that, even amid expanded state coordination of volunteers, property owners retain autonomy over their land and may choose whether or not to accept outside assistance. However, this protection is narrow and does not offset the broader regulatory and surveillance impacts on individual autonomy.
• Limited Government: The bill represents a marked expansion of state authority and bureaucracy, including the creation of a statewide licensing system for local public safety roles, the establishment of a new volunteer management database and administrative infrastructure, the delegation of broad rulemaking authority to state agencies (TCFP and TDEM) with minimal legislative oversight or sunset provisions, and the empowerment of state agencies to conduct ongoing surveillance via criminal background checks, including for spontaneous volunteers. These actions centralize disaster response functions previously handled at the local level and subject them to state regulation, often without a clear mechanism for opt-out, localized tailoring, or periodic legislative review. This contradicts the principle that government should be as limited as possible and defer to local authority wherever feasible.

• SB 2 (Similar To)