According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), SB 2 is expected to have a notable fiscal impact on both state and local governments, primarily due to the establishment of a new emergency manager licensing system and expanded mandates on training, reporting, and background checks. The creation and administration of the emergency manager licensure program will generate initial and ongoing costs for the Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP), which is designated to administer the program. These costs will include rulemaking, database development, staff time, background check coordination, and ongoing license processing and enforcement. The bill authorizes the commission to collect fees to offset these administrative costs, but initial start-up expenses may require General Revenue appropriations unless front-funded by licensing receipts or other appropriated funds.

The Department of State Health Services (DSHS) and the Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM) are tasked with developing and delivering mass fatality response training to justices of the peace. This effort will likely require curriculum development, training materials, instructional staff, and possible travel or technological infrastructure expenses. While some of this training may be provided through existing resources or federal preparedness grants, ongoing delivery to newly elected justices and tracking of compliance could result in increased agency workloads and associated administrative costs.

At the local level, counties and cities will bear new compliance responsibilities, including the adoption of incident command succession plans, the conduct of annual emergency response drills, and the submission of standardized after-action reports. Smaller jurisdictions, particularly those with populations under 68,750, may incur additional staffing or consulting costs to meet these requirements, especially if they lack full-time emergency management staff. However, the bill exempts jurisdictions from drill requirements in years when they are subject to a disaster declaration, slightly reducing the burden in affected areas.

Finally, expanded access to state and federal criminal history records by TCFP and TDEM could increase the workload for the Department of Public Safety (DPS), though these impacts may be mitigated through fee recovery for background checks. The net fiscal impact will depend on rulemaking decisions, fee levels, and the volume of license applicants and disaster volunteers processed annually. Overall, while the bill creates new fiscal obligations, its cost-recovery mechanisms and use of existing agency frameworks may contain long-term state budget impact if efficiently implemented.

SB 2 presents a comprehensive and multifaceted overhaul of Texas’s disaster preparedness, response, and recovery framework. While its intent is to address serious challenges exposed during the July 4, 2025 floods, such as gaps in coordination, autopsy backlogs, and undertrained emergency officials, it does so in a manner that centralizes authority in state agencies, imposes new regulatory mandates on both public and private actors, and creates lasting administrative programs with open-ended fiscal implications. These characteristics place the bill in substantial tension with several core Liberty Principles, and as such, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on SB 2 unless amended as described below.

The most consequential provision in SB 2 is the creation of a mandatory, state-administered licensing system for emergency management coordinators (EMCs). Under SB 2, local jurisdictions are barred from allowing someone to serve as an EMC for more than six months without obtaining a state-issued license administered by the Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP), in coordination with the Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM). The licensing framework includes multiple tiers, minimum training requirements, background check-based disqualifications, annual renewal mandates, and continuing education obligations. While the bill allows some alternative credentialing (e.g., military or out-of-state experience), the structure still removes local discretion, imposes uniform state standards on a historically flexible and community-driven role, and subjects local emergency appointments to recurring state oversight. This is a significant encroachment on both Individual Liberty and Limited Government.

SB 2 also revives provisions from the original filed version of SB 1 (First-called special session, 89th) that were removed in the committee process, most notably the creation of a statewide volunteer registration and credentialing system. Under this system, TDEM would manage a database of all volunteers deployed in disaster response, including background checks and the authority to disqualify individuals based on criminal history. Although waivers are allowed during urgent emergencies, the bill still requires government or affiliated volunteers to register and be screened before deployment. This risks undermining Personal Responsibility and long-standing traditions of mutual aid, substituting them with a permission-based regime that could deter civic engagement and delay response. While well-intended as a safety mechanism, it overextends the state’s role in regulating civil society.

Private sector autonomy is also curtailed. The bill mandates that campground operators located in floodplains install rooftop-access ladders on cabins, develop formal evacuation plans, and implement those plans when flash flood warnings are issued. Though rooted in a legitimate safety concern following deadly floods, these rules represent a prescriptive, one-size-fits-all mandate on private property owners without offering alternative compliance pathways, risk-based exemptions, or cost-sharing incentives. Similarly, new mandates for local governments, such as required annual disaster drills and post-disaster after-action reports, add administrative burdens to small jurisdictions without providing state-funded resources for compliance. These provisions raise red flags under both Free Enterprise and Private Property Rights principles, particularly where the bill provides no flexibility for local conditions or capacity.

The bill also expands state bureaucracy in several ways. It authorizes multiple new programs and planning bodies, including a mass fatality operations rapid response team, a centralized fatality tracking system, expanded access to criminal history data for multiple agencies, and a statewide meteorological sensor work group. While many of these components reflect thoughtful planning and are non-coercive in themselves, they contribute to a broader trend toward the permanent expansion of centralized emergency infrastructure, a trend not matched by any mechanism for review, rollback, or legislative reevaluation. There is no sunset clause attached to the new licensing regime, the volunteer system, or any of the associated administrative programs. Without such constraints, these provisions risk becoming enduring components of a growing state apparatus.

From a fiscal perspective, SB 2 imposes costs on both the state and local governments. TDEM and TCFP are tasked with new administrative functions, including licensing, rulemaking, database maintenance, and training oversight. Although the bill authorizes fee collection and the use of grants or donations to offset costs, the long-term financial burden, especially for unfunded local mandates, remains indeterminate, raising limited government concerns about fiscal sustainability and scope creep.

In sum, SB 2 is driven by a sincere and necessary goal: to improve Texas’s capacity to respond to large-scale natural disasters. It proposes thoughtful improvements to planning, communication, and intergovernmental coordination. However, the methods it chooses rely too heavily on regulatory compulsion, centralized licensing, and state control over volunteer and local activity. These approaches conflict with Texas’s historical reliance on decentralized governance, civil society initiative, and local discretion in times of crisis.

Thus, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on SB 2 unless amended as described.

• Limit mandatory licensing only to high-risk jurisdictions or specialized roles
• Exempt spontaneous and low-risk volunteers from registration requirements
• Offer flexible compliance alternatives for private businesses
• Include sunset provisions for all new programs created under the bill

• Senate Committee on Finance: 14Y/0N (1 Absent)
• House Select Committee on Disaster Preparedness & Flooding: 6Y/0N (3 Absent)

• HB 2 (Similar To)