According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), the fiscal implications of HB 783 are currently indeterminate. According to the LBB and the Office of Court Administration, it is not possible to estimate the number of civil cases that may arise under the bill’s newly created cause of action for online impersonation. As such, the potential financial impact on the court system, such as increased case volume, administrative costs, or resource allocation, remains uncertain.

The bill authorizes courts to award injunctive relief, actual and exemplary damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs. While this could incentivize litigation and increase civil filings, the extent of that impact is unknown. Without reliable data on how frequently these impersonation cases might be brought, neither administrative costs to the judiciary nor any corresponding increases in local government expenditures can be projected with confidence.

At the local level, the bill could affect county courts and clerks depending on how often these suits are filed and whether they require more judicial or administrative support. However, since these proceedings would be civil in nature, they are not expected to incur significant enforcement costs like criminal cases might. Overall, while the bill introduces new civil litigation pathways, its fiscal impact will depend on public awareness, legal viability, and the frequency of online impersonation incidents leading to legal action.

While HB 783 is well-intentioned in its effort to address the growing harm caused by online impersonation, it raises several serious concerns that warrant opposition from a liberty-focused perspective. The bill creates a new civil cause of action for online impersonation, allowing individuals to sue those who use their name, likeness, or other identifiers on social media without consent and with malicious intent. Though designed to protect victims, the bill introduces potential risks to constitutional freedoms, judicial integrity, and individual autonomy.

First and foremost, despite explicit exemptions for satire and parody, HB 783 still risks chilling protected speech. The standard of “intent to harm” is inherently subjective and could be invoked to suppress legitimate criticism, political commentary, or anonymous expression. Even frivolous lawsuits can be costly to defend against, potentially stifling speech before courts ever interpret the statute. This concern is heightened in the digital age, where satire, mimicry, and parody are key tools of dissent and political commentary.

Additionally, the bill invites legal abuse and weaponized litigation, empowering individuals to exploit the courts in disputes that might otherwise be resolved through existing tort law, such as defamation or invasion of privacy. This represents a quiet expansion of state power into private digital interactions, setting a precedent for further encroachment. Civil court dockets may also see a surge in filings, yet the fiscal impact of such an increase is indeterminate. For fiscal conservatives and those committed to judicial restraint, this creates unacceptable uncertainty and risk.

Finally, while the bill does not grow the size of government in a bureaucratic sense, it subtly expands the scope of government intervention by enabling civil enforcement of online behavior. This opens the door to further regulation of digital conduct and identity, and may incentivize lawmakers or courts to extend liability in future sessions. Rather than creating new statutes, lawmakers should prioritize strengthening existing remedies or encouraging platform-level solutions that do not involve state-backed coercion.

For these reasons—risk to free expression, opportunity for misuse, fiscal unpredictability, and quiet statutory expansion—HB 783 is incompatible with the principles of individual liberty, limited government, and free enterprise. As such, Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on SB 783.

• Individual Liberty: While the bill aims to protect individuals from unauthorized and harmful digital impersonation, it also risks infringing on freedom of speech, particularly anonymous or critical expression. Despite a specific exemption for parody and satire, the subjective standard of “intent to harm” could lead to self-censorship or overbroad enforcement against protected expression. Political satire, parody, and social commentary may be chilled if individuals fear civil liability for mimicking or referencing others online.
• Personal Responsibility: The bill promotes the concept of personal accountability by allowing civil actions against those who maliciously impersonate others online. It affirms that individuals must be responsible for the intentional misuse of someone else’s identity to deceive or cause harm. However, that benefit is diluted if the law can also be used to punish harmless or constitutionally protected conduct.
• Free Enterprise: Though the bill excludes liability for platforms under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, it still introduces new legal exposure for individuals and small content creators who engage in mimicry, satire, or activism. The threat of civil litigation—even in meritless cases—can discourage innovation, commentary, or creative expression. This form of legal risk may particularly harm digital entrepreneurs and small publishers without legal resources.
• Private Property Rights: Supporters of the bill could argue that one's name, image, or likeness is a form of personal property, and that the bill provides a remedy for those whose identity is misappropriated online. From this angle, the bill supports a narrow protection of personal property rights. However, liberty-minded analysts may counter that reputation and likeness, unlike physical property, are inherently expressive and should not be regulated too aggressively lest speech rights be curtailed.
• Limited Government: Though the bill does not create new agencies or spend public money, it expands the government’s role in policing digital expression through civil courts. It introduces a new statutory cause of action where common-law remedies (e.g., defamation, invasion of privacy) already exist. This quiet expansion of state civil power may set a precedent for future digital speech regulation, and could be viewed as a departure from the principle of minimalist, restrained government.

• SB 2682 (Same As)