The updated fiscal note for SB 5, as substituted in the House Public Health Committee, outlines the financial implications of creating the Dementia Prevention and Research Institute of Texas (DPRIT) and the associated Dementia Prevention and Research Fund. The fund would be capitalized with a one-time transfer of $3 billion from the General Revenue Fund, contingent on voter approval of a related constitutional amendment (SJR 3). While the bill itself does not appropriate funds, it provides the statutory framework for future appropriations and expenditures from this dedicated fund.

DPRIT is authorized to award up to $300 million annually in grants to support research on dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, and related disorders. These funds may also support facility construction, equipment purchases, and prevention programs. Administrative costs for operating the institute are projected at $22.4 million per year, including $6.8 million for 54 full-time staff, with the remainder covering facilities, operations, travel, and professional services. All operational costs will be paid from the dedicated research fund.

Though the institute is allowed to collect income from patents, royalties, and licenses, no revenue from these sources is currently projected in the fiscal note. Importantly, the fiscal note confirms that there will be no fiscal implications for local governments. Overall, SB 5 lays the groundwork for a significant state-led investment in neurodegenerative disease research, contingent on constitutional authorization for the use of state funds.

SB 5, while rooted in a well-meaning desire to expand research and innovation around dementia and related neurological disorders, represents a significant and ongoing expansion of state government into a domain that has historically been—and continues to be—well served by private-sector innovation and nonprofit research institutions. As revised by the House Public Health Committee, the bill not only establishes the Dementia Prevention and Research Institute of Texas (DPRIT) as a permanent state agency but also broadens its mandate to explicitly include Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, and related disorders. While the scope of covered diseases is now wider, the core concerns remain the same: this bill creates a permanent, publicly funded entity that duplicates many functions already being carried out by universities, research hospitals, and pharmaceutical firms.

The updated House version maintains the original structure of a new government bureaucracy, comprising an Oversight Committee, a Peer Review Committee, a Program Integration Committee, and multiple advisory bodies, including a Higher Education Advisory Committee populated exclusively by appointees from Texas university systems. The inclusion of these bodies reinforces the concern that DPRIT is being designed to favor large, entrenched institutions over smaller, private, or independent research efforts. Furthermore, the matching grant requirements and annual $300 million in allocations set up a pipeline of public money that may be inaccessible to newer or nontraditional entrants in the research space, further cementing institutional favoritism.

Moreover, the bill outlines an administrative apparatus with a projected annual cost of $22.4 million, including 54 new full-time state employees, to manage the program's operations. These are recurring costs paid out of a newly created fund that will be capitalized by a $3 billion transfer from General Revenue, contingent upon voter approval of a related constitutional amendment. Even though SB 5 does not appropriate funds directly, it clearly lays the statutory framework for that appropriation. The sheer scale of the fund—and its constitutional dedication—amounts to a long-term fiscal commitment that bypasses the normal annual budgetary scrutiny and ties up taxpayer dollars for a single policy domain at the expense of others.

Supporters of SB 5 may argue that government investment can supplement private research, but this bill does more than support—it establishes a permanent, government-run research institute with broad authority, independent hiring power, and perpetual funding. This approach contrasts with the core liberty principle of limited government, which calls for restraint in the creation and maintenance of taxpayer-funded agencies. Rather than spurring free-market solutions, SB 5 risks crowding them out by creating an entity that can pick winners and losers in the field of medical research based on bureaucratic review and political appointments.

Texas Policy Research continues to recommend that lawmakers vote NO on SB 5. While the cause it seeks to address is laudable, the mechanism by which it attempts to do so is not. A $3 billion constitutional carveout and a new government agency are not compatible with the principles of free enterprise, personal responsibility, or limited government. There are better ways to support dementia research—ones that involve incentivizing private innovation, not expanding taxpayer-funded bureaucracy.

• Individual Liberty: The bill does not impose mandates on individuals, nor does it restrict personal freedoms. However, the creation of a centralized, state-run research institution with constitutionally dedicated funds could indirectly reduce individual choice over time by crowding out private research efforts or influencing funding priorities through political processes rather than decentralized market demand. This government-led direction in medical research may subtly erode the individual’s influence over healthcare innovation priorities.
• Personal Responsibility: The bill neither encourages nor discourages personal responsibility in a direct manner. It is focused on research and infrastructure investment, not on individual behavioral interventions. However, by prioritizing state-funded solutions to complex health problems, it may reinforce a public expectation that the government, not individuals or families, should be the primary driver of long-term healthcare solutions.
• Free Enterprise: This is one of the most affected liberty principles. The bill inserts the state as a major player in the biomedical research marketplace through a $3 billion taxpayer-funded initiative. Although the grants are competitive, the structure favors established academic and institutional players, as evidenced by the composition of the advisory committees and matching fund requirements. Smaller startups, private labs, and nonprofit innovators may be effectively excluded or disadvantaged due to bureaucratic hurdles, limiting open competition and innovation in a field best served by market dynamism.
• Private Property Rights: The bill includes provisions that allow the state to retain intellectual property rights, collect royalties, and place liens on capital improvements developed with state grant funds. While this is designed to recoup taxpayer investment, it also means that any private or nonprofit entity accepting grant money may sacrifice full control over the outputs of their work. This creates a contractual limitation on private property rights for participants in the program, even if it is voluntarily accepted.
• Limited Government: The bill marks a substantial expansion of government power and permanence. It creates a new state agency with a large administrative staff, perpetual funding, rulemaking authority, and oversight structures. It also commits the state to a constitutionally dedicated fund, shielding it from future legislative scrutiny or prioritization. This is a textbook example of permanent bureaucratic expansion into a domain already populated by capable private actors, and thus conflicts directly with the principle of limited government.

Texas Dementia Prevention and Research Institute: A Costly Overreach in the Wrong Direction

• SJR 3 (Enabling for)
• HB 1302 (Similar To)
• HB 5 (Similar To)