Texas Bills Target Flock Cameras Ahead of 2027 Session

Estimated Time to Read: 32 minutes

Texas lawmakers are preparing for a significant debate over government surveillance as the 90th Legislative Session approaches. After months of controversy over Flock Safety cameras and taxpayer-funded surveillance networks, some lawmakers have filed proposals to restrict or prohibit government use of automatic license plate readers (ALPRs).

The concern crosses party lines. Republican statewide officials have already moved to restrict funding and new installations, and bills have come from members of both parties. Agreement on the remedy is another matter. Some proposals would prohibit government agencies from operating license plate readers altogether. Others would require warrants, limit the purposes for which the technology can be used, impose data retention limits, or establish oversight requirements for law enforcement agencies and their vendors.

At the center of the debate is a fundamental question: Should the government be permitted to continuously collect and store information about the movements of ordinary Texans who are not suspected of committing a crime?

The question is more pressing because the courts have not settled it. The Fifth Circuit, whose decisions govern federal courts in Texas, held in March that police use of license plate reader data to locate a vehicle was not a Fourth Amendment search. The debate is therefore about more than cameras mounted along Texas roads. It concerns the limits of government authority, the balance between public safety and individual liberty, and whether the Legislature should act where constitutional protections remain uncertain.

How Flock Cameras and License Plate Readers Track Vehicles

Automatic license plate readers use cameras and software to capture and identify vehicle license plates. Depending on the system, the information collected may include photographs, plate numbers, vehicle characteristics, geographic coordinates, and timestamps.

Unlike a single roadside camera, many ALPR systems store these observations in searchable databases. Law enforcement agencies can use the information to identify vehicles tied to criminal investigations, locate stolen automobiles, or assist in missing-person cases. The same technology also creates opportunities for surveillance that extend well beyond a particular investigation.

When thousands of cameras share a network, individual observations can be assembled into detailed records of where vehicles have traveled, when they appeared at particular locations, and how often they returned. A single camera recording a vehicle on a public roadway raises relatively limited privacy concerns. A network capable of reconstructing a person's movements over weeks or months presents a substantially different constitutional and policy question.

Those networks do not stop at jurisdictional lines. A Texas Tribune analysis of roughly 615,000 searches of the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) camera network in June found that 48 percent came from outside Texas, with more than 3,000 agencies querying the system. DPS has since restricted outside access, but as Texas Policy Research (TPR) previously analyzed, the episode showed how readily information collected in one place can be searched from another. TPR has examined these concerns as ALPR use has spread across the state, including the role of shared databases and private vendor arrangements.

Texas Officials Have Already Restricted Flock Cameras

The legislative proposals follow a series of executive actions that slowed the growth of the state's ALPR network without dismantling it.

In late August, Gov. Greg Abbott (R) directed state agencies to stop funding additional Flock cameras after a Texas Tribune investigation found that the Motor Vehicle Crime Prevention Authority (MVCPA) had directed at least $30 million toward more than 3,200 Flock cameras since 2023. The money came in part from an assessment on automobile insurance policies that lawmakers increased in 2023 to combat catalytic converter theft. The revelation raised an obvious question: Should fees ultimately borne by Texas drivers to fight auto theft finance technology capable of monitoring the broader public?

In September, Abbott directed the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) to stop approving new license plate readers on state rights-of-way, including approved installations that had not yet been built. On October 13, Comptroller Don Huffines (R) signed an executive order barring future grants administered by his office from being used to purchase or contract for ALPR equipment and services. That order does not reach MVCPA, which the Comptroller's office does not administer.

The distinction between executive action and statutory reform is important. None of these measures removes existing cameras, including roughly 940 operated by DPS along state roads. None prevents local governments from buying surveillance systems with other revenue, including federal grants, continuing existing contracts, or obtaining data collected by other jurisdictions. And none sets rules for how ALPR data may be searched, retained, or shared. A statewide legislative framework could establish more durable restrictions that apply regardless of changes in administrative policy.

Six Bills Offer Competing Approaches to ALPR Limits

As of mid-November, at least six bills filed ahead of the 90th Legislative Session address automatic license plate readers or related automated traffic enforcement. Although they share overlapping concerns, their legal and practical effects differ considerably.

Legislative Comparison

How Texas ALPR Bills Would Limit License Plate Surveillance

Four approaches filed for the 90th Legislature, compared with a national model and current Texas law.

Approach Government use Data retention Judicial authorization Sharing limits Enforcement
HB 331Rep. John Bucy III (D-Austin)Prohibition ProhibitedCovers the state, political subdivisions, and their officers and employees No collection permitted No warrant exception; use is barred outright No government use, so no government data to share Private lawsuit for actual damages or $1,000, plus fees; immunity waived
HB 847Rep. Brian Harrison (R-Midlothian)Warrant required Warrant or court order onlyData usable only for violent-offense investigations Prompt destructionOf data unrelated to a qualifying offense; no deadline set Required for any use; standard for a court order not specified No agreements giving data to private parties except for authorized purposes Written policy and published annual report; no private remedy
HB 763Rep. Mary González (D-San Elizario)Limited purposes Listed purposes onlyFelonies, uninsured or unregistered vehicles, missing persons, stolen vehicles, tolls and parking, secured areas 48 hoursLonger for a pending case, warrant, or court order; preservation requests expire in 7 days Probable-cause court order to retain or disclose data No private or federal sharing; other governments only for authorized purposes Private lawsuit; immunity waived; unlawfully released data inadmissible; annual report to DPS
HB 1167Rep. Salman Bhojani (D-Euless)Regulate & audit Permitted with safeguardsDocumented reasonable suspicion for targeted searches, with exceptions 30 daysIncludes vendor copies; documented exceptions reviewed every 90 days Probable-cause warrant to obtain data from private, non-vendor cameras No bulk access, sale, or default cross-agency sharing; vendor contract requirements Annual internal audits; DPS oversight; attorney general equitable relief; no private damages
PEEPS ActInstitute for Justice modelNational model Warrant for historical dataData older than two hours, with narrow exceptions; real-time access needs reasonable suspicion of a felony 7 daysUp to 14 days to seek a warrant; longer by warrant, court order, or consent Warrant meeting Fourth Amendment requirements for historical searches No sharing outside the jurisdiction except under access rules or a court order; never sold or released to private parties Unlawfully accessed data inadmissible; escalating loss of database access; supervisor audits every 30 days
Texas todayCurrent lawNo statute No ALPR statuteGoverned by agency policy and general law None in statute None; the Fifth Circuit held the ALPR use in Porter was not a search None in statute; DPS restricted outside access by policy 2026 executive funding and permit restrictions only

Bills as introduced. SB 232 (restricting MVCPA insurer-fee revenue for ALPRs) and HB 1142 (automated traffic enforcement) are not shown because they address funding and traffic enforcement rather than how ALPR data is collected and used.

Sources: Texas Legislature Online (HB 331, 847, 763, 1167); Institute for Justice; United States v. Porter.

Texas Policy Research

Some of these approaches are familiar. During the 89th Legislative Session (2025), Harrison filed House Bill 961 (HB 961), which would have generally required a warrant or court order for law enforcement ALPR use, and Bucy filed House Bill 2083 (HB 2083), which would have permitted specified uses while generally requiring captured data to be destroyed within 48 hours. Neither received a committee hearing. Harrison has returned with a similar warrant-based approach; Bucy now proposes an outright prohibition, and González's HB 763 carries forward the 48-hour retention model.

HB 331 Would Prohibit Government Use of License Plate Readers

House Bill 331 (HB 331) by State Rep. John Bucy III (D-Austin) is the most sweeping proposal. It would prohibit any governmental entity from using an ALPR, defining governmental entity to include the state, its political subdivisions, their agencies and departments, and their officers and employees. Because the bill prohibits use rather than ownership, it reaches further than a ban on agency-owned cameras alone.

The bill would allow any person to sue a violator and recover either actual damages or $1,000 in statutory damages, plus court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. It expressly waives sovereign and governmental immunity to the extent of that liability, giving individuals a direct way to challenge unlawful government conduct.

The bill's brevity leaves practical questions. It contains no exceptions for missing-person investigations, stolen-vehicle recovery, or other uses on which agencies now rely. It also does not say whether querying data from privately operated cameras or third-party databases counts as "use," or how existing contracts would be unwound.

HB 847 Would Require Warrants for ALPR Use

House Bill 847 (HB 847) by State Rep. Brian Harrison (R-Midlothian) would allow law enforcement agencies to use ALPRs only as authorized by a warrant or court order. Images and related data could be used only to investigate violent offenses as defined in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

Data would have to be destroyed promptly after collection unless the vehicle is involved in a qualifying offense or an ongoing investigation of one, or is registered to a person who is. Agencies could not agree to provide ALPR data to private parties except for an authorized purpose. Agencies using the technology would have to adopt written policies and publish annual reports on the number of plates scanned and the number of scans used in investigations that led to an arrest or prosecution.

The warrant-or-court-order requirement sets HB 847 apart from approaches that allow officers to search historical databases on reasonable suspicion. But the bill leaves interpretive questions. It does not say whether a warrant must authorize operating a reader or only searching what the reader collects. Its requirement that nonqualifying data be destroyed after collection suggests an authorized reader would still capture unrelated vehicles, making the warrant an authorization to operate the reader. Read that way, the bill would work much like a prohibition on fixed, always-on cameras. It also sets no deadline for "prompt" destruction and does not say whether a court order must rest on probable cause or a lesser standard.

Either way, HB 847 would establish a far narrower framework for law enforcement ALPR use than one based on generalized investigative authority.

HB 763 Would Allow Limited Use With 48-Hour Retention

House Bill 763 (HB 763) by State Rep. Mary González (D-San Elizario) proposes a comprehensive regulatory framework. Rather than prohibiting ALPR systems, it would allow government entities to operate them only for specified purposes: felony investigations, identifying unregistered or uninsured vehicles, missing-person investigations, stolen-vehicle recovery, toll collection and parking enforcement, and controlling access to secured areas. Agencies could not use the uninsured-vehicle authority in a way that targets people based on race, ethnicity, or income.

Captured data would generally have to be destroyed within 48 hours. Longer retention would require a pending criminal case, a warrant, or a court order, and an agency or criminal defendant seeking such an order would have to offer specific and articulable facts showing probable cause that the data is relevant to an ongoing felony or missing-person investigation. A written preservation request could hold data for up to seven days, but only with a sworn statement that the requester will seek a court order within that time.

The bill would bar sharing data with private parties except under such an order, limit sharing with other governmental entities to authorized purposes, and prohibit making data available to the federal government. Agencies would have to post their usage rules online and report annually to DPS. Data released in violation of the law would be inadmissible in court unless offered as exculpatory evidence, and, like HB 331, the bill would authorize private lawsuits with statutory damages and waive governmental immunity.

Still, HB 763 would authorize routine collection for several purposes without a warrant, including uses such as identifying uninsured vehicles that extend beyond serious crime. A short retention period limits how much history accumulates, but it does not eliminate the government's ability to collect and search data during the permitted window. HB 763 would substantially regulate government surveillance without ending the underlying practice.

HB 1167 Would Regulate ALPR Searches, Vendors, and Audits

House Bill 1167 (HB 1167) by State Rep. Salman Bhojani (D-Euless) offers the most detailed regulatory approach. It would apply to governmental entities that employ peace officers or firefighters and to their vendors. It would exclude systems used only for tolls, parking, or access control unless their data is used for law enforcement.

Before searching historical ALPR data for a particular vehicle or person, placing a vehicle on an alert list, or beginning targeted monitoring, an officer would need reasonable suspicion and would have to document the supporting facts, the vehicle's connection to the offense, and a case number. Exceptions would apply to executing a warrant or court order, locating stolen vehicles or missing persons, finding people with active arrest warrants, and responding to imminent threats of death or serious bodily injury. An ALPR alert alone would not justify a stop.

Notably, an agency could obtain ALPR data from a private entity other than its own vendor only with a warrant issued on probable cause. That provision addresses a growing source of surveillance data: cameras owned by homeowners associations, businesses, and other private parties.

The bill would set a general 30-day retention limit that expressly reaches vendor copies and shared platforms, with exceptions for data tied to specific investigations, legal process, or documented emergencies. It would prohibit unrestricted, continuous, or bulk access by other agencies, bar the sale or monetization of ALPR data, require vendors to disable cross-agency sharing by default, and require tamper-evident audit logs. Agencies would conduct annual internal compliance audits, publish their policies, and report aggregate data each year.

The bill raises questions of its own. Its reasonable-suspicion standard is less demanding than probable cause, and it permits routine collection, regulating only how data is later searched and retained. Its definition of reasonable suspicion also covers only offenses "being committed or about to be committed." Read literally, that may not cover searches to investigate a completed crime, the most common investigative use, which lawmakers would need to clarify. Enforcement would rest on DPS oversight and equitable relief sought by the attorney general, and the bill expressly declines to create a private cause of action or waive immunity from damages. Agencies would not have to comply until September 1, 2028.

SB 232 Would Restrict Insurance Fee Revenue for ALPR Systems

Senate Bill 232 (SB 232) by State Sen. Carol Alvarado (D-Houston) and others focuses on the financing behind license plate surveillance. It would bar certain fees imposed on motor vehicle insurers under the MVCPA statute from being used to purchase or use ALPRs, or to contract with someone to do so.

The proposal directly addresses the controversy over insurance-related fees financing surveillance equipment, and it would put into statute a restriction that now rests on executive direction. But it would not prohibit agencies from operating ALPR systems with other money. Local governments could continue financing them through general revenue, federal grants, or other arrangements. SB 232 addresses a particular financing mechanism rather than establishing comprehensive surveillance protections.

HB 1142 Addresses Automated Traffic Enforcement

House Bill 1142 (HB 1142) by State Rep. Terry Canales (D-Edinburg) addresses a related but legally distinct issue. Texas banned red-light cameras in 2019, and current law bars municipalities from using automated speed enforcement. HB 1142 would extend that prohibition to all local authorities and law enforcement agencies and to all traffic laws, with the attorney general enforcing it.

At the same time, it would create a new exception allowing automated systems in construction and maintenance work zones, and it would exempt those systems from the red-light camera ban. Citations could be issued only by a peace officer at the time of the violation, could not be mailed or sent electronically afterward, and would require conspicuous warning signs. Agencies would have to adopt policies for promptly deleting data unrelated to an active investigation or proceeding. A similar bill, HB 3309, passed the House during the 89th Legislative Session (2025) but did not advance in the Senate.

HB 1142 is aimed at traffic enforcement rather than the collection of vehicle-location histories, but its work-zone systems would capture license plate images all the same. Equipment deployed for one purpose can support others, which is why statutory language must clearly define permissible uses and keep technology authorized for limited purposes from becoming a tool for broader monitoring.

Texas ALPR Bills Differ on Warrants, Retention, and Accountability

The most consequential differences among the four principal ALPR bills involve when agencies may collect or search information, how long records may be kept, and what remedies exist when agencies break the rules.

Policy Comparison

Four Bills, Seven Policy Questions

How the four principal license plate reader bills filed for the 90th Legislature answer the same policy questions.

Policy question HB 331Prohibition HB 847Warrant required HB 763Limited purposes HB 1167Regulate & audit
Government ALPR use Prohibited Only with a warrant or court order Limited to listed purposes PermittedTargeted searches need documented reasonable suspicion
General retention N/A (use prohibited) Prompt destructionOf nonqualifying data 48 hours 30 days
Judicial authorization N/A (use prohibited) Required for use Probable-cause court orderTo retain or disclose data Probable-cause warrantTo obtain data from private, non-vendor cameras
Private damages remedy Yes Not created Yes Expressly excluded
Other enforcement Immunity waived Public reporting Immunity waived; unlawfully released data inadmissible Internal audits, DPS oversight, attorney general
Data sharing limits N/A (use prohibited) No private sharing except for authorized purposes No private or federal sharing; government sharing limited to authorized purposes No bulk access, sale, or default cross-agency sharing; vendor controls
Annual reporting N/A Published online Submitted to DPS Published online and submitted to DPS

Bills as introduced. Authors: HB 331, Rep. John Bucy III (D-Austin); HB 847, Rep. Brian Harrison (R-Midlothian); HB 763, Rep. Mary González (D-San Elizario); HB 1167, Rep. Salman Bhojani (D-Euless).

Source: Texas Legislature Online (HB 331, 847, 763, 1167).

Texas Policy Research

The bills are not stronger or weaker versions of the same policy; they establish fundamentally different legal frameworks. HB 331 would end government use. HB 847 would permit it only with judicial authorization and only for violent crimes. HB 763 would permit listed uses under strict retention and sharing limits. HB 1167 would build a compliance system governing access, retention, auditing, and vendors. A central question for lawmakers is whether to restrict the government's authority to collect information or to regulate what happens to it after collection.

How the Texas Bills Compare With a National Model

Lawmakers do not have to design an ALPR framework from scratch. The Institute for Justice (IJ), a national public interest law firm, launched its Plate Privacy Project in August 2025 to challenge warrantless ALPR surveillance through litigation and legislation. As part of that effort, it published model legislation, the Protecting Everyone from Excessive Police Surveillance (PEEPS) Act, most recently revised in September 2026. The model offers a useful benchmark because it is built around the distinction at the heart of this debate: the difference between seeing a vehicle now and searching where it has been.

The model regulates location information broadly rather than any single technology. It covers data collected by license plate readers, cameras, sensors, and drones, including privately owned databases that government officials access. It separates contemporaneous information, which reveals a location less than two hours old, from historical information. Officials could access historical location data only with a warrant meeting the Fourth Amendment's requirements, with consent, in exigent circumstances, or for a short list of purposes, such as arresting someone with an outstanding felony warrant or resolving a specific toll, traffic, or parking violation. Real-time access would require reasonable suspicion of a felony, an imminent threat, or an automated hotlist match limited to the single scan that triggered the alert.

The model pairs those access rules with strict safeguards. Data could be kept no longer than seven days, or 14 days with a supervisor's written finding that it is needed to seek a warrant, and longer only under a warrant, court order, or consent. Officials would need written supervisor approval before each search, every access would be logged, and supervisors would audit those logs at least every 30 days for signs of pretextual searches. Data could not be shared outside the collecting jurisdiction except under the access rules or a court order, and it could never be sold or released to private parties, including through public records requests.

Enforcement rests on consequences for the government rather than damages. Data accessed in violation of the model would be inadmissible in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding. An official who violates it would lose database access for seven days, then 30 days, then permanently after a third violation, and the attorney general could seek injunctive relief. Local governments could adopt stricter rules but not looser ones.

None of the Texas bills tracks the model exactly, but most borrow part of its logic. HB 847 comes closest on judicial authorization, though it applies its warrant requirement to all ALPR use rather than distinguishing historical searches from real-time alerts. HB 763's 48-hour retention limit is shorter than the model's seven days, and it includes a similar exclusionary rule. HB 1167 resembles the model's structure of documented searches, supervisor review, and audit logs, but it allows historical searches on reasonable suspicion rather than a warrant, keeps data for 30 days, and audits annually rather than monthly. HB 331 goes beyond the model by prohibiting government use entirely, and both HB 331 and HB 763 add a private damages remedy that the model does not include.

The model also raises questions the Texas bills leave open: whether protections should follow location data regardless of the technology that collects it, whether historical searches should require a warrant while real-time alerts require less, and whether officials who misuse these systems should lose access to them.

Fourth Amendment Questions Complicate the Debate

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution provides similar protection. Traditional doctrine holds that people have diminished expectations of privacy in what they expose to public view. Modern surveillance technology, however, can aggregate those public moments in ways that change the scope of government observation.

In Carpenter v. United States (2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held that acquiring historical cell-site location records was a Fourth Amendment search, recognizing that extensive location data can reveal sensitive details of a person's life even when individual movements occur in public. This June, in Chatrie v. United States, the Court held that obtaining historical location information through a geofence warrant is also a search.

Neither decision established a rule for license plate readers, and courts remain divided. This fall, a federal district court in Oklahoma held in United States v. Kyle that a deputy's warrantless search of a month of a vehicle's ALPR history across several states violated the Fourth Amendment. But the Fifth Circuit, whose decisions govern federal courts in Texas, reached the opposite conclusion in March in United States v. Porter, holding that police use of license plate reader data to locate a vehicle was not a search. In January, a federal judge in Virginia likewise upheld Norfolk's citywide Flock camera network against a Fourth Amendment challenge, though he acknowledged that further expansion could tip the balance; the residents who sued, represented by the Institute for Justice, have appealed to the Fourth Circuit. As TPR has previously analyzed, Kyle and Porter differ in the scale of the data involved, and Porter has asked the Supreme Court to review the Fifth Circuit's decision.

Until that question is resolved, the controlling federal precedent in Texas offers drivers little constitutional protection against warrantless ALPR searches. The constitutional question is not whether police may see a license plate on a public road. It is whether the government may accumulate and search comprehensive records of people's movements without individualized judicial authorization. Courts may answer that question one case at a time. The Legislature can answer it now with statutory protections that exceed the constitutional minimum, as at least 28 states have done in some form.

Retention and Shared Networks Raise Privacy Risks

Retention matters because a surveillance database grows more valuable as observations accumulate. A system holding only recent data may help locate a stolen vehicle. A system holding months of data can reconstruct travel patterns, identify recurring destinations, and reveal associations between people.

HB 763's 48-hour limit would restrict the accumulation of history far more than HB 1167's 30-day standard. Both allow longer preservation in specified circumstances, but they police those exceptions differently. Under HB 763, a preservation request holds data for no more than seven days unless a court issues a probable-cause order. Under HB 1167, preservation rests on an agency's own documentation, reviewed at least every 90 days internally. Lawmakers will need to decide whether agencies should be able to extend retention without independent review.

Vendor arrangements raise additional concerns. When private companies run surveillance infrastructure for many jurisdictions, contract terms and shared database settings can determine who sees what, as the out-of-state searches of the DPS network showed. HB 1167 addresses this through limits on bulk access, default sharing, vendor permissions, and monetization, and its warrant requirement for privately collected data closes a route around those limits. HB 763 also restricts sharing, including with federal agencies. Meaningful privacy protections must reach the whole network through which data can be accessed, not just the agency operating a camera.

Private Enforcement Could Give Restrictions Teeth

Statutory restrictions are only as effective as the means available to enforce them. HB 331 and HB 763 would let individuals sue and would waive governmental immunity, and HB 763 would also make unlawfully released data inadmissible in court. HB 1167 relies on internal audits, DPS oversight, and equitable relief sought by the attorney general. HB 847 requires policies and public reporting but creates no comparable private remedy.

An agency can adopt sound policies on authorization, deletion, and sharing, but without meaningful consequences for violations, compliance depends on internal administration. Private lawsuits add accountability but expose governments to litigation costs and disputes over damages. Centralized enforcement promotes statewide consistency but depends on regulators finding violations and acting on them. Lawmakers must decide whether to rely on individual remedies, state oversight, or both.

Government Should Meet the Standard It Sets for Others

TPR has examined the expansion of government surveillance in a series of reports on Flock cameras, taxpayer funding, data retention, and constitutional protections. In written testimony to the House Committee on Delivery of Government Efficiency for its August 19 hearing, Texas Policy Research Action noted that the Texas Data Privacy and Security Act exempts state agencies and political subdivisions from many of its provisions, and argued that government should be held to the same standard of data stewardship it expects from private businesses.

The underlying principle is that technological capability should not define the boundaries of government authority. That agencies can collect, store, and analyze enormous amounts of information does not mean they should have unrestricted authority to do so, particularly over people who are not suspected of wrongdoing. Government has legitimate public safety responsibilities, but those responsibilities do not eliminate the need for constitutional boundaries, meaningful oversight, and accountability when officials exercise investigative powers.

What the Bills Would Mean for Law Enforcement

An outright prohibition under HB 331 would require affected entities to end ALPR use and revisit existing contracts and investigative practices. A warrant-based framework under HB 847 would preserve targeted investigative uses while requiring judicial approval. HB 763 and HB 1167 would allow broader use but require agencies to change their policies, retention practices, data-sharing agreements, and compliance procedures, which could add administrative and technical costs for smaller agencies. Vendors could need to change system architecture, default sharing settings, deletion capabilities, and contracts.

ALPR systems do assist investigations involving stolen vehicles, missing persons, and serious crimes, and limits on access or retention may reduce the information available in some cases. But legitimate investigative uses do not settle whether continuous collection of information about everyone else is justified. The strongest framework will be the one that most clearly separates targeted investigations from routine monitoring of people who have done nothing wrong.

Key Policy Questions for the 90th Texas Legislature

The threshold question is whether government agencies should collect and retain license plate information about people who are not suspected of any crime. Every other choice follows from the answer. HB 331 answers no outright, HB 847 comes close by tying any use to judicial authorization, and HB 763 and HB 1167 accept routine collection while trying to limit what happens to the data afterward.

If collection continues, lawmakers must decide what it takes to look back through it. A warrant supported by probable cause places a neutral judge between an officer and a person's travel history. Documented reasonable suspicion is easier to satisfy and relies on the agency to police itself. Closely tied to that standard is how long records should exist at all, whether hours, days, or weeks, and who should be able to approve keeping them longer. The shorter the retention period and the more independent the approval, the less a database can serve as a standing record of everyone's movements.

The networks themselves raise further questions. Texas will need to decide how surveillance data may move among local governments, state agencies, federal authorities, private vendors, and privately owned cameras, since rules that bind only the agency operating a camera can be sidestepped wherever the data travels. Lawmakers must also decide whether individuals harmed by violations should be able to sue governmental entities directly or whether enforcement should rest with administrators and the attorney general. Underlying all of it is the question that first drew public attention: whether Texans should finance surveillance networks through dedicated fees, grants, or local budgets at all.

These questions extend beyond Flock Safety or any single vendor. The answers could set precedents for how Texas regulates facial recognition, artificial intelligence, location tracking, and other forms of automated data collection.

The 2027 Legislature Must Set Surveillance Limits

Concern about automatic license plate readers now spans the Governor's office, the Comptroller's office, and both parties in the Legislature. That concern does not guarantee agreement on a remedy. Some lawmakers would prohibit the technology, others would preserve it for narrowly defined investigations, and still others would regulate its continued use.

Those distinctions will matter as bills move through committee. Restricting a funding source does not prohibit surveillance. Shortening a retention period does not necessarily prevent mass collection. Requiring agencies to document searches does not provide the same protection as requiring advance judicial authorization. And transparency requirements do not automatically give individuals meaningful remedies when their rights are violated.

Texas lawmakers must decide whether to regulate the existing surveillance infrastructure or fundamentally reconsider the government's authority to collect and analyze the movements of ordinary Texans. The debate ultimately concerns a principle that extends well beyond license plate readers: Government power should be defined and limited by law, not expanded simply because technology makes new forms of surveillance possible.


More on Surveillance & Privacy

Every analysis, testimony, and commentary we've published on how government collects, keeps, and shares data on Texans.

View All


Support Our Work

Texas Policy Research relies on generous donors across Texas. If you found this helpful, please consider supporting our efforts.

Donate Today

Stay in the Loop

Subscribe for occasional emails with new research, event details, and ways to engage with Texas policy.

Subscribe for Updates