According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), no significant fiscal implication to the state is anticipated from HB 3744. The bill would revise the definition of “intervenor” for purposes of the Crime Victims’ Compensation program, which could increase the number of people eligible for compensation.
The Office of the Attorney General, which administers the Crime Victims’ Compensation program, anticipates that the bill could increase the amount paid to victims because of the larger pool of eligible applicants. However, the LBB assumes that any additional costs could be absorbed using existing program funding, meaning the fiscal note does not identify a need for new appropriations or a measurable cost to general state revenue.
For local governments, the LBB also anticipates no significant fiscal implication. The bill affects eligibility within a state-administered compensation program and does not impose a new local duty, mandate, or enforcement obligation.
Texas Policy Research recommends that lawmakers vote NO on HB 3744. The bill is well-intentioned, but it expands eligibility within an existing state-administered compensation program. The bill changes the definition of “intervenor” under the Crime Victims’ Compensation Act so that a person injured or killed while aiding another may qualify if the person was acting in a good faith effort to prevent a “criminal offense,” rather than the narrower category of “criminally injurious conduct.” The bill analysis expressly describes the purpose as expanding eligibility for crime victims’ compensation.
The principal limited-government concern is that the bill broadens the scope of a public benefit program. Although helping another person in danger is admirable, the question for lawmakers is whether the state should further extend taxpayer-supported compensation for voluntary intervention. A conservative or libertarian analysis may reasonably conclude that good Samaritan conduct should be encouraged through culture, family, community institutions, private charity, restitution, and civil remedies rather than by expanding a government compensation framework.
The fiscal concern is limited but not absent. The LBB states that no significant fiscal implication to the state is anticipated, but it also notes that the Office of the Attorney General expects an increase in payments from the Crime Victims’ Compensation program because more applicants may become eligible. The LBB assumes those additional costs can be absorbed within existing funding, but “absorbed” costs are still costs within a taxpayer-supported program and may create pressure for additional funding if future claims exceed expectations.
The bill does not appear to increase regulatory burdens on individuals or businesses. It does not create a criminal offense, increase criminal penalties, change eligibility for community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision, or expressly grant additional rulemaking authority. Those features limit the bill’s coercive impact and make it narrower than many other government expansions.
Even so, the broader definition of “criminal offense” creates a concern about program boundaries. “Criminal offense” may sweep more broadly than “criminally injurious conduct,” potentially extending compensation eligibility beyond the most serious or directly injurious situations. That broader terminology could increase administrative discretion and invite future claims at the margins, even if the immediate fiscal note is modest.
The bill does not impose a new mandate or regulatory burden, but it expands the scope of an existing public compensation program and increases potential taxpayer exposure without a sufficiently narrow limiting principle. A narrower version limited to intervention involving violent offenses, imminent bodily injury, or immediate threats to another person would better address the stated concern while reducing the risk of incremental program expansion.