89th Legislature

SJR 3

Overall Vote Recommendation
No
Principle Criteria
Free Enterprise
Property Rights
Personal Responsibility
Limited Government
Individual Liberty
Digest

SJR 3 proposes a constitutional amendment to establish the Dementia Prevention and Research Institute of Texas (DPRIT), a state-managed entity charged with advancing research, treatment, and prevention efforts for a broad range of neurodegenerative diseases. The proposed amendment creates the Dementia Prevention and Research Fund, a special fund outside the state’s General Revenue Fund. It mandates an initial transfer of $3 billion from general revenue on January 1, 2026, and permits annual appropriations up to $300 million to support the institute’s work. This funding would be used to provide grants for scientific research, develop therapies, and support infrastructure and prevention programs targeting dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, and related disorders.

The institute would be authorized to award grants to Texas-based universities, research institutions, private organizations, and collaborative partnerships involved in biomedical research and clinical studies. Grant funding could support both basic and translational research efforts as well as the construction or renovation of facilities associated with neurodegenerative disease research. A matching funds requirement mandates that recipients contribute at least 50% of the value of each grant in private or institutional funds. Governance provisions include six-year terms for institute leadership and authority to establish oversight mechanisms for the appropriate use of funds.

By embedding this institute and fund into the Texas Constitution, the amendment would effectively dedicate long-term state resources to an expanded state role in medical research. This would reduce legislative flexibility in reallocating funds in future budget cycles. The proposed constitutional amendment will appear on the November 4, 2025, general election ballot and requires voter approval to take effect.

Author
Joan Huffman
Co-Author
Carol Alvarado
Brian Birdwell
Cesar Blanco
Juan Hinojosa
Nathan Johnson
Jose Menendez
Borris Miles
Angela Paxton
Royce West
Judith Zaffirini
Sponsor
Tom Craddick
Greg Bonnen
Todd Hunter
Senfronia Thompson
Pat Curry
Co-Sponsor
Alma Allen
Rafael Anchia
Trent Ashby
Jeffrey Barry
Cecil Bell, Jr.
Keith Bell
Salman Bhojani
Rhetta Bowers
John Bryant
Bradley Buckley
John Bucy III
Ben Bumgarner
Angie Chen Button
Briscoe Cain
Elizabeth Campos
Terry Canales
Giovanni Capriglione
Sheryl Cole
Nicole Collier
David Cook
Philip Cortez
Charles Cunningham
Drew Darby
Aicha Davis
Yvonne Davis
Jay Dean
Mano DeAyala
Mark Dorazio
Harold Dutton
Paul Dyson
Caroline Fairly
Maria Flores
James Frank
Erin Gamez
Cassandra Garcia Hernandez
Josey Garcia
Linda Garcia
Gary Gates
Stan Gerdes
Charlie Geren
Barbara Gervin-Hawkins
Jessica Gonzalez
Mary Gonzalez
Vikki Goodwin
Ryan Guillen
Sam Harless
Cody Harris
Caroline Harris Davila
Richard Hayes
Cole Hefner
Ana Hernandez
Gina Hinojosa
Donna Howard
Lacey Hull
Ann Johnson
Jolanda Jones
Venton Jones
Helen Kerwin
Ken King
Stan Kitzman
Marc LaHood
Suleman Lalani
Stan Lambert
Brooks Landgraf
Jeff Leach
Terri Leo-Wilson
Mitch Little
Oscar Longoria
Janie Lopez
Ray Lopez
A.J. Louderback
J. M. Lozano
John Lujan
Christian Manuel
Armando Martinez
Trey Martinez Fischer
Don McLaughlin
John McQueeney
William Metcalf
Morgan Meyer
Terry Meza
Joseph Moody
Penny Morales Shaw
Christina Morales
Eddie Morales
Matt Morgan
Sergio Munoz, Jr.
Candy Noble
Tom Oliverson
Claudia Ordaz
Angelia Orr
Jared Patterson
Dennis Paul
Mary Perez
Vincent Perez
Dade Phelan
Mihaela Plesa
Richard Raymond
Ron Reynolds
Ana-Maria Ramos
Ramon Romero, Jr.
Toni Rose
Jon Rosenthal
Michael Schofield
Alan Schoolcraft
Matthew Shaheen
Joanne Shofner
Lauren Simmons
John Smithee
David Spiller
James Talarico
Steve Toth
Chris Turner
Gary Vandeaver
Denise Villalobos
Armando Walle
Terry Wilson
Eugene Wu
Erin Zwiener
Fiscal Notes

According to the Legislative Budget Board (LBB), the fiscal implications of the Committee Substitute to SJR 3 remain significant. The resolution mandates a one-time transfer of $3 billion from the General Revenue Fund to establish the Dementia Prevention and Research Fund, a constitutionally dedicated fund that will support research, infrastructure, and prevention efforts related to dementia, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, and related disorders. This transfer is scheduled for January 1, 2026, and results in an estimated reduction of $3,000,191,689 from General Revenue during the biennium ending August 31, 2027. This amount includes $191,689 in administrative costs associated with publishing the resolution for the November 4, 2025, election.

The fund is constitutionally restricted in use and would be managed by the Dementia Prevention and Research Institute of Texas. It will be supplemented by legislative appropriations, as well as gifts, grants, and donations. The resolution authorizes annual appropriations of up to $300 million from the fund, beginning in fiscal year 2026, with unspent amounts eligible to carry forward each year. However, the actual fiscal impact of future appropriations beyond the initial transfer will depend on enabling legislation and budgetary decisions in future sessions.

Notably, the $3 billion transfer is excluded from the state’s constitutional spending limit under Article VIII, Section 22, preventing it from crowding out other budget priorities within that cap. However, the amendment does not create a new revenue stream to support or replenish the fund, and the long-term returns on investment from research or commercial applications (such as patents or licensing) are speculative and not factored into fiscal projections.

No fiscal impact on local governments is anticipated.

Vote Recommendation Notes

SJR 3 continues to represent a substantial and permanent expansion of state government by constitutionally mandating the creation and funding of a new state-managed medical research institute. While the resolution’s scope has been broadened to include Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease in addition to dementia, this expansion intensifies concerns about governmental overreach and fiscal entrenchment. The measure would lock $3 billion in taxpayer funds into a dedicated fund, with up to $300 million available annually for research, infrastructure, and operations—thereby removing legislative discretion and tying the hands of future lawmakers. These funds would be unavailable for other pressing state needs such as infrastructure improvements, disaster preparedness, education, or tax relief.

The principle of limited government is undermined by this proposal, as the state assumes an open-ended role in medical research, a domain where private institutions, universities, and philanthropic organizations have long been successful. Texas is already home to some of the world’s leading medical research centers—including MD Anderson and UT Southwestern—that have achieved breakthroughs without the need for constitutionally dedicated funding streams. Rather than duplicating these efforts with a government-run research entity, the state should focus on facilitating private innovation through streamlined regulation and competitive grant opportunities.

The constitutional amendment’s inflexibility is a key concern. Once enacted, the $3 billion transfer and $300 million annual appropriation cap will be locked into the Texas Constitution. Unlike general appropriations, which can be adjusted annually based on economic or policy shifts, a constitutional funding mechanism is nearly impossible to revise without returning to the voters. The resolution provides no clear mechanism to ensure fiscal accountability or measurable outcomes, and any research returns, such as patents or licensing royalties, remain speculative and outside the scope of the legislation. Moreover, the funding does not count against the state’s constitutional spending limit, creating a potential incentive for future off-budget expansions of state programs.

By embedding this expanded initiative into the state constitution, SJR 3 sets a precedent for taxpayer-funded, disease-specific institutions to seek permanent constitutional entrenchment. This model opens the door to a proliferation of similar amendments, each with its own earmarked fund, further fragmenting the budget and reducing transparency and flexibility in state finance.

For these reasons, Texas Policy Research continues to recommend that lawmakers vote NO on SJR 3. Lawmakers should instead support policies that empower the private sector, promote competitive grants through normal appropriations, and uphold the constitutional principle that state government should remain limited in scope and nimble in function. Rejecting this amendment preserves legislative flexibility and prioritizes fiscal prudence and free-market innovation.

  • Individual Liberty: The resolution does not directly infringe on individual rights or personal freedoms. However, by establishing a state-run research institute with a broad health mandate, it opens the door for future regulatory entanglements or state influence over private medical practices and innovation pathways. While the aim is disease prevention and treatment, embedding health initiatives in the constitution sets a precedent for state-led health policy at the expense of personal choice and market-driven solutions.
  • Personal Responsibility: The resolution shifts responsibility for major public health research efforts from individuals, philanthropic institutions, and the private sector to the government. Rather than incentivizing private investment or grassroots medical philanthropy, it institutionalizes reliance on the state to drive scientific discovery and public health strategy. This can reduce the sense of ownership and accountability within communities, research institutions, and healthcare providers, undermining the ethic of self-determination and voluntary cooperation.
  • Free Enterprise: By entering into direct competition with private-sector research institutions and philanthropically funded organizations, the state disrupts the incentive structures of the biomedical innovation market. The state-run institute, backed by billions in guaranteed public funds, may crowd out private investment and distort the allocation of resources by introducing non-market forces into the research landscape. Additionally, the matching-funds requirement (50% of grant value) may be seen as a concession to private involvement, but in practice, large institutional players may benefit disproportionately, while smaller innovators and entrepreneurs are left at a disadvantage.
  • Private Property Rights: There is no immediate threat to private property rights within the language of the resolution. However, since public funds may be used for the construction, renovation, or purchase of research facilities, the potential exists for future property-related disputes, including eminent domain claims. This concern is currently speculative but should not be dismissed if the institute expands its physical footprint over time.
  • Limited Government: This resolution is a direct violation of the principle of limited government. It creates a new, constitutionally enshrined government entity—the Dementia Prevention and Research Institute of Texas. It permanently dedicates $3 billion in taxpayer funds and allows for up to $300 million in annual appropriations, insulated from the General Revenue Fund and exempt from the state’s spending limit​. These funding mechanisms lock in long-term state spending, bypassing the normal legislative appropriations process and future policy debates. Future legislatures would need a constitutional amendment and another statewide election to revise or repurpose this commitment, severely restricting policy flexibility. This measure sets a dangerous precedent by embedding ongoing health policy in the Texas Constitution—a trend inconsistent with a minimalist, accountable state framework.
View Bill Text and Status