Who Should Govern When Cities Fail?

Estimated Time to Read: 9 minutes

The proposal to establish municipal receivership in Texas has generated significant attention among those frustrated by local governments that repeatedly fail to perform their most basic responsibilities. When a city wastes taxpayer dollars, refuses to enforce state law, allows violent crime to flourish, or neglects essential public services, many Texans understandably conclude that the State should step in.

On that point, there should be little disagreement.

Cities and counties are not sovereign governments. They are political subdivisions created by the Texas Legislature. They possess only those powers granted to them by state law and remain subject to legislative oversight. When municipalities repeatedly fail to fulfill their obligations to the people they serve, the State of Texas not only possesses the constitutional authority to intervene, but in extraordinary circumstances may also have a constitutional duty to do so.

The real constitutional question, however, is not whether the State should intervene. The real question is who should govern when cities fail.

Municipal Receivership and Executive Authority

Supporters of municipal receivership correctly argue that local governments should not be allowed to disregard state law, mismanage public finances, or abandon their responsibility to provide for public safety.

Among the proposal's most prominent advocates is State Rep. Tom Oliverson (R-Cypress), who recently took to social media to say:

"I have been quietly working on Municipal Receivership for some time now. It is a tremendous tool for accountability with local governments, useful under a variety of circumstances… Legislation inbound y'all!"

Source: State Rep. Tom Oliverson (R-Cypress), X Post 7.7.2026

Representative Oliverson is correct about one important point. Municipal accountability matters.

Where reasonable constitutional conservatives may disagree is not over the need for accountability, but over where that accountability should ultimately reside. The question is not whether the State of Texas possesses the authority to intervene when municipalities fail. It unquestionably does.

The question is whether that extraordinary authority should primarily belong to the executive branch or remain accountable to the Legislature, where the people themselves are represented.

That distinction is more than procedural. It is constitutional.

State Supremacy Does Not Mean Executive Supremacy

Much of the public discussion surrounding municipal receivership has focused on the relationship between the State and local governments.

That is only half of the constitutional conversation. The State of Texas is not synonymous with the Governor's Office. The State acts through three separate constitutional branches.

The Legislature writes the laws. The executive enforces the laws. The judiciary interprets the laws.

This separation of powers is not an inconvenience. It is one of the primary constitutional protections for liberty.

The municipal receivership proposal currently under discussion would place extraordinary authority almost entirely within the executive branch. Under the proposed framework, the Attorney General would certify qualifying conditions, the Governor would declare receivership, and a Governor-appointed Receiver would assume sweeping authority over local government.

Meanwhile, the Legislature, the branch directly accountable to the people of Texas, would have little ongoing role once the statutory framework was enacted.

That should concern conservatives.

Conservative Principles Require Institutional Restraint

Conservatism has never been merely about achieving desirable policy outcomes. It has also been about preserving constitutional structures that protect liberty regardless of who occupies public office.

Good constitutional design does not assume today's officeholders will always exercise power wisely. It asks whether tomorrow's officeholders should possess the same authority. The question is not whether Texans trust today's Governor. The question is whether Texas should permanently create another mechanism through which future Governors may exercise extraordinary authority over local governments with minimal legislative involvement.

Constitutional conservatives have traditionally answered that question with caution.

The Lessons of Executive Authority After COVID

Texas need not search far into its own history to appreciate why this debate matters.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor exercised broad emergency authorities under existing disaster statutes (some of which are still disputed) to issue executive orders affecting businesses, churches, schools, local governments, healthcare facilities, and nearly every aspect of daily life.

Reasonable Texans disagreed about many of the individual decisions made during that period.

What became increasingly difficult to dispute was that an extraordinary amount of policymaking authority had become concentrated within a single constitutional office.

Many lawmakers openly questioned whether existing emergency powers granted too much unilateral authority to the executive branch. Numerous reform proposals followed. Some became law. Others quietly faded.

The broader constitutional conversation largely disappeared without resolving many of the structural concerns lawmakers themselves had raised in the immediate wake.

Importantly, the Legislature ultimately found it necessary to enact legislation restoring or clarifying protections that many Texans believed should never have required legislative correction in the first place. Lawmakers passed legislation ensuring that Texans could not be penalized for choosing not to wear a face covering. They also strengthened protections, ensuring residents of nursing homes and long-term care facilities could receive visits from loved ones after many families endured painful periods of isolation.

Whether one supported or opposed the original policies is almost beside the point.

The Legislature itself recognized that statutory clarification had become necessary because existing executive authority had reached areas many members believed warranted legislative involvement.

That history should not be forgotten.

The Shelly Luther Example

Perhaps no individual better illustrates the institutional questions surrounding executive authority than Texas State Rep. Shelly Luther (R-Tom Bean).

Today, Representative Luther serves in the Texas House of Representatives. During the COVID-19 pandemic, however, she became nationally known after reopening her Dallas hair salon in defiance of statewide executive orders issued under the Governor's disaster authority. The legal proceedings that followed ultimately resulted in her incarceration for contempt of court, creating one of the defining constitutional controversies of the pandemic in Texas.

Reasonable people can disagree about the legal merits of that particular case. What cannot reasonably be disputed is that the episode fundamentally changed how many Texans viewed emergency powers and executive authority.

One of the current members of the Texas Legislature personally experienced the consequences of broad statutory delegations of executive power. That experience should encourage lawmakers to think carefully before creating another statutory framework that similarly concentrates extraordinary authority within the executive branch.

Municipal Accountability Should Remain Legislative Accountability

None of this suggests that municipalities should escape accountability. Far from it.

If local governments repeatedly fail to perform their constitutional responsibilities, the Legislature possesses broad authority to establish standards, define objective criteria for intervention, require corrective action, authorize temporary state involvement, and determine when local authority should be restored.

Those are legislative decisions.

They involve balancing competing public interests, establishing public policy, and determining the proper relationship between the State and its political subdivisions. Those responsibilities naturally belong within the Legislature. The executive branch should faithfully administer whatever framework the Legislature creates. It should not become the principal policymaker for extraordinary governmental interventions.

Political Opportunity Should Not Become Constitutional Policy

Support for municipal receivership is understandable. Many of the jurisdictions most often discussed are large progressive cities whose policies frequently conflict with statewide priorities regarding public safety, immigration enforcement, fiscal responsibility, and the rule of law.

Political frustration, however, should never become the foundation for constitutional design.

It is tempting to support expanded governmental authority when today's officeholders generally share one's own political philosophy. Constitutions are not written for today's officeholders. They are written for tomorrow's.

The same authority that may today be used against progressive municipal governments could tomorrow be exercised against conservative jurisdictions by an administration holding very different political priorities. That is precisely why conservatives have traditionally favored limiting and dividing governmental power rather than concentrating it.

State Supremacy Without Executive Supremacy

Texas Policy Research (TPR) previously examined a proposal by Gov. Greg Abbott (R) to create a Texas Chief State Prosecutor and reached a similar conclusion. The concern was never whether genuine governmental problems existed. The concern was whether solving those problems required transferring additional authority away from representative institutions and into the executive branch.

Municipal receivership presents the same constitutional question.

Texas unquestionably possesses authority over its municipalities. That authority belongs to the State. The question is how the State should exercise it. The strongest constitutional answer is through the branch of government closest to the people. The Legislature creates municipalities. The Legislature defines municipal authority. The Legislature should remain central whenever extraordinary intervention becomes necessary.

That preserves both state supremacy and constitutional accountability.

Constitutional Conservatism Requires More Than Good Intentions

Representative Oliverson is right that Texans deserve accountable local government. The question is what constitutional mechanism best delivers that accountability.

Municipal governments should never be permitted to repeatedly violate state law, squander taxpayer resources, or abandon their responsibility to protect the public.

The State of Texas has both the authority and, when necessary, the obligation to intervene.

The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how easily broad statutory delegations can evolve into sweeping executive policymaking. The Legislature itself later found it necessary to restore protections for individual Texans after concluding that existing executive authority had reached further than many members believed appropriate.

Texas should not repeat that institutional mistake.

If municipal receivership becomes law, it should remain firmly rooted in legislative oversight and accountability to the people rather than executive discretion alone.

Cities may be creatures of the Legislature. They should not become creatures of the Governor.

State supremacy should never become executive supremacy.

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